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It would be a denial of the dignity of human nature and the relative importance of the faculties
with which we are endowed, were we to condemn at one time austere reason engaged in
investigating causes and their mutual connections, and at another that exercise of the
imagination which prompts and excites discoveries by its creative powers (Alexander von
Humboldt 1858,78).
°°°°°
The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes
and natural objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organic bodies in their
manifold forms—these were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge
of Nature which have been made during the last four hundred years. But this method of
investigation has also left us as a legacy the habit of observing natural objects and natural
processes in their isolation, detached from the whole vast interconnection of things; and
therefore not in their motion, but in their repose; not as essentially changing, but as fixed
constants; not in their life, but in their death. And when, as was the case with Bacon and Locke,
this way of looking at things was transferred from natural science to philosophy, it produced the
specific narrow-mindedness of the last century, the metaphysical mode of thought 1… (Fredrich
Engels 1878 [1934],27).
°°°°°
Can one “explain” the magic of life to someone who cannot perceive it in the smallest of everyday
things, or, better, who does not carry it within himself (Rosa Luxemburg 1917 in Bronner
1978,205)?
°°°°°
The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it (Karl
Marx 1845 in Frederick Engels 1886).

Paradox triumphed. (Emmy

Ball-Hennings 2

°°°°°
c. 1940 in Huelsenbeck 1974,xxxv)

°°°°°
L’imagination au pouvoir. Power to the imagination. (Popular slogan, Paris, May 1968)
°°°°°
In reality, we have good reason to ask whether, if another world does not rapidly become
possible, any world at all will remain actual (John P. Clark 2014).

1

The term “metaphysical” was used here by Engels to refer to a way of looking at the world that is static,
abstracted from the whole, un-dialectical. See J.D. Bernal, circa 1930s, “Engels and Science”, Labour Monthly
Pamphlets #6. Accessed April 29, 2019: https://www.marxists.org/archive/bernal/works/1930s/engels.htm.
Accessed November 19, 2019.
2 Emmy Ball-Hennings was one of the few women among the founding members of the early twentieth-century
avant-garde art movement known as Dada.
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INTRODUCTION: THE STRUCTURE OF AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL REVOLUTION
Recently thinkers in the arts, sciences, and philosophy have been working to challenge empirical,
hierarchical, and dualistic forms of knowledge production. Such scholars and creative
practitioners speculate that without a fundamental, widespread sense of human situatedness
within, rather than outside of or above, an externalized conception of “nature”—a mindset I refer
to as an ecological imaginary—any efforts to address present-day socio-ecological issues will
ultimately prove insufficient.

This thesis connects examples of dialectical, anti-dualist stances as echoed throughout certain
eighteenth- through twenty-first-century humanist and post-humanist movements in a range of
disciplines. It shows how the new materialist/agential realist current in contemporary
philosophy—the notion that observer and observed are mutually constituted—is reinforced by
contemporary research in biology and physics. I propose an understanding of being as an intricate
ensemble—a state of individuality and inherent interrelationship at the same time—can be of
great value within (and outside) the environmental humanities as constructive, interdisciplinary
approaches to the Anthropocene3 epoch are developed and deployed. In conclusion, drawing
inspiration from the sciences and the visual and sonic arts, I offer practical techniques which can
be used to realize a state of intricate ensemble.

3

The term “Anthropocene” to describe human-behavior-driven impact on planet-wide atmospheric and ecological
systems came into informal use in studies of global change around the turn of the millennium (Paul Crutzen et al.,
2011).
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The first chapter offers an introduction to the concept of the “social imaginary” and the
mechanisms through which collective perception and social conventions and values can form and
shift. I connect phenomenology—an inherently paradoxical philosophy involving the effort to
objectively examine one’s own subjective experiences—with movements to overcome the
pervasive notion that humans are separate from nature.

In Chapter Two, I describe how an emphasis on positivist and reductive scientific methods
developed particularly during the European Enlightenment contributed to the conceptual
dualism between (particular) humans and an externalized “nature,” and how this mindset has
contributed to all manner of socio-political-environmental crises now unfolding. I identify
Romantic Naturalists such as Goethe, Humboldt, Schelling, Engels, and others within the
European intellectual tradition who were aware of the potential pitfalls of their culture’s
propensity toward atomistic, hierarchical thinking, and were in favor of positioning humans
within—not separate from or superior to—other humans and the rest of existence (as was and
continues to be the widely accepted view among populations uninfluenced by Enlightenment
scientific thought, including many peoples considered Indigenous 4).

4

Examples of Indigenous peoples include Native North Americans such as the Inuit and Iñupiat of what is now
Alaska, Central American peoples including the Wixáritari or Huichol of what is now Mexico, the Quechua peoples
of the Andes in South America, Aboriginal Australians, the Mbuti People of the Congo region of Africa, to name
only a few among thousands of groups around the world. The UN International Labour Organization estimates that
370 million people in over 70 countries are Indigenous or tribal. The ILO defines Indigenous as having descended
“from populations who inhabited the country or geographical region at the time of conquest, colonization, or
establishment of present state boundaries.”
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/indigenous-tribal/WCMS_503321/lang--en/index.htm/. Accessed November 19,
2019.
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In Chapter Three, I propose the Romantic Naturalists’ tendency toward non-dualistic thinking
dovetails with that of more recent practitioners in the fields of social ecology, the sciences, and
the environmental humanities who work to disrupt the “logic” of the industrial age.5 I outline
how contemporary topics in biology and philosophy of science, particularly microbiome research
and the emerging field of multispecies ethnography (the study of human existence as a function
of relationships with other species), trouble conventional classification methods and atomistic
epistemologies, and offer support for new materialist/agential realist positions.

In the fourth chapter I demonstrate how some twentieth- through twenty-first-century
humanist/post-humanist-motivated avant-garde art movements, notably those involving
collaboration and spontaneity including Dadaism, Surrealism, and forms of improvised music,
share aims in common with the earlier Romantic Naturalist tradition, mid-twentieth-century
phenomenology, and contemporary new materialist concepts. I show how practices associated
with each of these movements confirm the tenuousness of conceptual dualisms, such as that
between humans and nature and humans and other humans, and, as such, contribute
constructively to humanist and post-humanist critiques of modern sciences, particularly those
conducted in the service of industry and profit.

5

This includes a host of post-1990 theories of non-hierarchical interrelationship under the heading of “new
materialism” including Bruno Latour’s parliament of things and actor network theory (ANT), Karen Barad’s agential
realism, Donna Haraway’s naturecultures, and the object-oriented ontology (OOO) of Graham Harman and
Timothy Morton.
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In Chapter Five, in response to my claim that current forms of environmental research that
depend on disinterested “objective observation” are ill-equipped to grasp human
interdependence with the perceived externalized entity (“nature”) they are now being tasked to
preserve, I suggest creative practices with a critical basis in science and social ecology can
contribute to nature-culture and sustainability studies by providing tools and techniques that
foster

an

ecological

imaginary—an

intra-relational,

dialectical,

non-dualistic,

non-

anthropocentric position of connection and care from within which to address human-induced
social and ecological challenges. I conclude with a number of practical examples.

My argument in sum, covered in the concluding chapter: The perception of humans and nature
as binary constructs with humans as the superior and rightful dominators of nature and one
another, harbored even by a relatively small population, is at the root of catastrophic
consequences currently being wrought on a planetary scale. Rather, the conception of ourselves
as part of an “intricate ensemble” that exists in reciprocal intra-relationship with one another
and our surroundings is not only more socially and ecologically beneficial in the immediate-term,
it is more evolutionarily viable. If current ecological crises are ultimately rooted in (some) humans
thinking and acting as if they are separate and superior, the solution then is for those humans to
become viscerally aware of their complicity and assume responsibility for the devastating effects
of their actions, and choose to act instead as part of the larger organism which, in fact, they (we)
are. I argue that knowledge produced by the environmental humanities and some forms of
science and art, in powerfully modeling this mindset, can help bring about its actualization.

8

1. PHENOMEN-OBVIOUS-OLOGY

Overwhelming evidence that Earth has entered the Anthropocene epoch6—a new geological age
in which certain forms of human activity are catastrophically disrupting global biogeochemical
processes—is cause for profound existential crisis on a planet-wide scale. Ever more dire reports
of forced human migration, species extinction, and rapidly warming climate are being published
with increasing frequency and urgency in tone.7,8,9,10 For those with access to the data, the upshot
is clear: An entire vibrant planet, our only home, is being catastrophically altered by the shortsighted, exploitative practices of certain humans, with some (specifically those in positions of
extreme wealth and power) causing exponentially greater harm than others. But what is
considered self-evident to some can remain obscured to others. Before proceeding to
deconstruct and reconstruct what is taken to be “real,” we will begin with a brief overview of the
social construction of the obvious more generally.

Aspects of a culture that are tacitly agreed upon could be considered parts of a “social imaginary.”
For example, whether it is “normal” for a few to reap massive profits from environmentally-

6

“The Anthropocene: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives” cites Paul J. Crutzen as the originator of the term:
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2010.0327. Accessed November 19, 2019.
7 A report from the UN Refugee Agency claims that as of June 2019 70.8 million people have been forcibly
displaced worldwide: https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html/. Accessed October 23, 2019.
8 The 2019 Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) study shows
up to a million species could be under threat of extinction due to human activity:
https://www.ipbes.net/news/ipbes-global-assessment-summary-policymakers-pdf/. Accessed October 23, 2019
9 CO2 levels surpassed 415ppm—a record high—at the Mauna Loa Observatory in May 2019:
https://scripps.ucsd.edu/programs/keelingcurve/2019/06/04/animation-of-keeling-curve-history-updated-toinclude-2019-milestone/. Accessed October 23, 2019
10 A 2018 University of Alaska study anticipates Arctic near-surface permafrost will melt by 2050, 70 years sooner
than earlier predictions: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-07557-4/. Accessed October 23, 2019
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devastating systems of governance and industry while others suffer from exploitation; the kinds
and value of currency and types of goods and services that are worth exchanging for it; whether
humans are integral to or separate from (and/or superior to) all other entities; whether members
of a society should be considered fundamentally equal; the bases upon which groups of
organisms are classified; or accepted beliefs about what becomes of the essence of a person after
death. In a 1976 document titled “The Politics of Scientific Conceptualization,” Norman Diamond
explained that our thinking is shaped by the culture in which we find ourselves:
All our ideas, whether in science, politics, or music, are conditioned by our world-view.
They are thus indirectly shaped by our society and our position in it. We develop or accept
ideas as they seem to make sense to us in terms of our general explanatory framework.
Life in any particular society thus shapes the range of understanding and approaches in
any particular realm of thought, as societies change, as world-views change, new ranges
of conceptual possibility are opened in every sphere of thought (Diamond 1976 in
Schmalzer et al. 2018,24).

The concept of the social imaginary is further elucidated by Cornelius Castoriadis in The
Imaginary Institution of Society. Castoriadis raises questions that can help to illuminate a society’s
underlying imaginary:
Every society up to now has attempted to give an answer to a few fundamental questions:
Who are we as a collectivity? What are we for one another? Where and in what are we?
What do we want; what do we desire; what are we lacking? Society must define its
‘identity’, its articulation, the world, its relations to the world and to the objects it
contains, its needs and its desires (Castoriadis 1987,146-147).
He goes on to cite some of the cultural artifacts people use to measure personal and collective
identity:
…images or figures, in the broadest sense of the term: phonemes, words, bank currency,
jinns, statues, churches, tools, uniforms, body paintings, numerical figures, border-posts,
centaurs, cassocks, lictors, musical scores—but also the totality of what is perceived in
nature, that is or could be named by the society in question…The social imaginary is,
10

primordially, the creation of significations and the creation of the images and figures that
support these significations (Castoriadis 1987,238).

Far from static, such significations are constantly shifting as influenced by the individuals and
groups involved in shaping them. A paradoxical aspect of that which some may consider obvious
is that it can, by its very nature, remain hidden in plain sight, able to be written off as “just the
way things are,” overlooked as unremarkable, deemed unworthy of scrutiny, or assumed to be
already attended to by someone else.

In the case of current threats to our planet’s biosphere, for example, the problems are, for the
most part, being handled in ways broadly considered practical, convenient, reasonable,
seemingly attainable, pragmatic.11 Debates rage over details such as which issues should be
isolated, prioritized, and addressed (carbon emissions? biodiversity loss? sea level rise?
deforestation?), and which individual solutions are likely to be most effective (political action
versus personal action? “greening” the current globalized economy? building new socioeconomic systems from scratch?). Twentieth-century American philosopher Joseph Grange
deemed the standard compartmentalized approaches to “saving the environment” forms of
dividend ecology:
…[dividend ecology] regards the interaction of humankind and nature solely from the
perspective of investment and returns. Dividend ecology has a simple message: if we
continue to destroy our environment, we will perish. Its motive force is fear, being largely
“In Western ideology, ‘pragmatic’ is a term of praise, in contrast to ‘ideological,’ which is pejorative. For
scientists, pragmatism means accepting the boundary conditions imposed by commoditization and
specialization…Therefore advice must be limited to the domain of the acceptable; the dread of the raised eyebrow
that withdraws credibility acts to impose not only prudence in giving advice but also, eventually to narrow the
intellectual horizons of the advisers. In the pragmatist’s eyes, strong feelings about the injustice of social
arrangements are necessarily suspect as ideological, reflecting immaturity as against scholarly cool” (Levins and
Lewontin 1985,207).
11
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a negative movement that seeks to restrain our greed and diminish the aggression with
which we attack nature (Grange 1977,136).
While the above sentiment may, at first glance, seem fairly reasonable, the notion that in order
to save ourselves we must save an “environment” composed of discrete, isolatable,
manipulatable parts overlooks a subtle but crucial—and arguably very obvious—detail: the
environment is us, with “us” loosely defined as “intra-active” phenomena that depend on
dynamic interrelationship with absolutely everything else for existence.12,13

Grange suggests a superficial assessment of “the obvious,” while perhaps moderately useful in
coping with acute issues in the short-term, must be scrutinized until an underlying foundational
ecology is revealed, one that is “capable of renewing the human spirit and assisting in its growth”:
As foundational, ecology must penetrate below the surface of the obvious. What is the
obvious? It is that which is taken for granted and never spoken of as such; yet, the obvious
everywhere and always guides and supports our culture. The obvious is that with which
we already agree—the base from which all action, individual and social, proceeds. Since
it is never explicitly discussed nor articulated, the obvious is the most difficult to identify,
even though in a disguised manner it lies all around us. To uncover the obvious we must
take a step back from the assumptions and attitudes that entwine us (Grange 1977,136).

12 According to philosopher Karen Barad (whose work I explore in greater depth in Chapter Three), “There are no

preexisting, separately determinate entities called ‘humans’ that are either detached spectators or necessary
components of all intra-actions. Rather, to the extent that ‘humans’ emerge as having a role to play in the
constitution of specific phenomena they do so as part of the larger material configuration, or rather the ongoing
reconfiguring, of the world. Thus no a priori privileged status is given to the human—and this is precisely the point.
‘Humans’ are emergent phenomena like all other physical systems” (Barad 2007,338).
13 In Tibetan Buddhism, the Mantra of Interdependent Origination (Pratītyasamutpāda) states everything that
exists can only do so in intricate interrelationship with everything else. If the circumstances that would cause a
thing to come into being never come to pass, then a thing cannot arise. If causative circumstances cease, then the
thing that is caused also ceases. “This is, because that is. This is not, because that is not. This comes to be, because
that comes to be. This ceases to be, because that ceases to be.” It therefore stands to reason that in order to effect
change, the underlying conditions that allow the problematic thing to arise must be changed. See Thich Nhat
Hanh’s 1998 The Heart of Buddha’s Teaching, Chapter Twenty-Seven:
https://terebess.hu/zen/mesterek/Thich%20Nhat%20Hanh%20%20The%20Heart%20of%20Buddha%27s%20Teaching.pdf. Accessed December 29, 2019.
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Within the above paragraphs, Grange (inadvertently or not) pinpoints how phenomenology—the
study of human perception and experience—is central to the development of a foundational
ecology. For Grange, to uncover the obvious one must first “take a step back from the
assumptions and attitudes that entwine us.” In Art and Existentialism Arturo B. Fallico states, “In
the existentialist-phenomenological view, philosophy has to do with the discovery of what really
is before us in that which we accept as commonplace, ordinary, and ‘obvious’” (Fallico 1962,8).
Paradoxically, it is through observing our own observations, it is suggested, we can most
effectively take stock of our situation: “The philosophical effort consists of two distinct phases or
moments. The first involves a radical clearing away of all that obstructs direct vision; the second,
an exercise of the unobstructed vision thus obtained” (Fallico 1962,8).

Twentieth-century French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty offers additional guidance:
It is because we are through and through compounded of relationships with the world
that for us the only way to become aware of the fact is to suspend the resultant activity,
to refuse it our complicity…Not because we reject the certainties of common sense and a
natural attitude to things…but because, being the presupposed basis of any thought, they
are taken for granted, and go unnoticed, and because in order to arouse them and bring
them to view, we have to suspend for a moment our recognition of them. The best
formulation of the reduction is probably that given by Eugen Fink, Husserl’s assistant,
when he spoke of ‘wonder’ in the face of the world (Merleau-Ponty 1962,xiii).

Edmund Husserl, the founder of the field of phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty’s teacher,
countered what he termed the “physicalistic rationalism” of modern Western science with its
propensity to mathematize an externalized, separate-from-human “nature” with what he termed
“transcendental subjectivism” (Husserl 1970,68). Husserl’s approach acknowledged that while
our (seemingly) conscious experience of the world is inherently situated within phenomena, it is
13

simultaneously possible and valuable to temporarily suspend judgment of that experience in
order to examine it.

To recognize that the recommended sense of detachment is a mental stance, not a literal aspect
of the human condition, is of utmost importance if the negative aspects of dualism are to be
averted. Husserl traces to Galileo and Descartes the origins of the widespread “idea of nature as
a really self-enclosed world of bodies” that contains a “natural causality in which every
occurrence is determined unequivocally and in advance.” He claims that “the weight of the
theoretical and practical successes [of science], beginning immediately with Galileo, had its
effect,” both positive and negative, on culture at large (Husserl 1970,60,73-74):
In general we must realize that the conception of the new idea of ‘nature’ as an
encapsulated, really and theoretically self-enclosed world of bodies soon brings about a
complete transformation of the idea of the world in general…The splitting of the world
and the transformation of its meaning were the understandable consequences of the
exemplary role of natural-scientific method…Natural science possessed the highest
rationality because it was guided by pure mathematics and achieved, through inductions,
mathematical results…Should knowledge, if it is to attain the status of a genuine science
which goes beyond nature, not follow the example of natural science, or, even better,
that of pure mathematics, insofar as we have, perhaps in other spheres of knowledge, the
‘innate’ faculty of apodictic self-evidence through axioms and deductions (Husserl
1970,61)?

The idea that it is possible to attain a kind of universal knowledge that can go beyond nature is
perhaps the operative issue here. A logical extension of “mathematization” was to imagine
everything, including philosophical and ethical matters, could be explained empirically,
potentially offering a kind of omniscience. This justifiable temptation contained a “hidden
absurdity”: the unintended and paradoxical effect of casting doubt onto all that could not, in fact,
be mathematized, and forcing concepts into quantitative formulations to which they may not
14

have otherwise lent themselves; “…from this point on, even all the accomplishments of meaning
and validity which are founded on experience are called into question” (Husserl 1970,74,76).

What can or should be done once a “hidden absurdity” has been identified? Twentieth-century
French thinker Henri Lefebvre believed that people, through thorough examination of the habits
and customs that shape everyday life, can identify elements that reinforce undesirable outcomes
and make requisite adjustments to evoke social and political shifts. He suggested that:
Everywhere there is interaction between a place, a time and an expenditure of energy
there is rhythm….for there to be change, a social group, a class or a caste must intervene
by imprinting a rhythm on an era…In the course of a crisis, in a critical situation, a group
must designate itself as an innovator or producer of meaning. And its acts must inscribe
themselves on reality (Emphasis the author’s. Lefebvre 2004,14-15).

Lefebvre described such an agent of change as a rhythmanalyst,14 one who, “capable of listening
to a house, a street, a town as one listens to a symphony” (Lefebvre 1992[2004],87), then goes
beyond reflection on the conditions of existence to deploy creative interventions with the
purpose of altering the reality at hand:
Without claiming to change life, but by fully reinstating the sensible in consciousness and
in thought, [the rhythmanalyst] would accomplish a tiny part of the revolutionary
transformation of this world and this society in decline. Without any declared political
position (Emphasis the author’s. Lefebvre 1992[2004],26).

Before such interventions can be skillfully crafted and deployed, a thorough understanding of the
origins of current “rhythms” may be useful. In the following chapter, I examine the sources of the

14

“Lefebvre notes how the term rhythmanalysis itself is taken from [Gaston] Bachelard, although as it is also
noted, it originates [in 1931] with the Portuguese writer Lucio Alberto Pinheiro do Santos” (Lefebvre 1992
[2004],xiii).
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kinds of mindsets upon which prevailing exploitative, competitive, hierarchical, dualistic
imaginaries are based.
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2. THE ENLIGHTENMENT: UNDUE DUALISM (AND ITS UNDOING)
A wide array of ideas taken for granted in the modern industrialized world with regard to
economics, ethics, politics, and science were born in Western Europe approximately 300 years
ago. The age in history known as the Enlightenment is now broadly understood to have been a
time when major epistemological shifts occurred in a geographical region commonly referred to,
particularly in academic circles, as “the West.” While scholarly accounts may detail particular
aspects of this complex historical moment, we will take for granted a few foundational concepts
for the purposes of this research: during the Enlightenment, myth and superstition came to be
viewed as threatening (and inferior) to forms of knowledge deduced using reason and logic;
information that could be measured and quantified was coming to be accepted as more “real”
and reliable than that derived through feeling or intuition; it was presumed that the question of
“progress”—how to create fairer and more just societies and thereby improve quality of life for
all—could be solved solely through rational analysis.15

From a position over two-and-a-half centuries hence, it is possible to proclaim, as did Horkheimer
and Adorno in their 1987 Dialectic of Enlightenment, that so-called Enlightenment thought is rife
with contradictions. The pair argued, “the not merely theoretical but practical tendency toward
self-destruction has been inherent in rationality,” and “under the given circumstances the gifts

15

While an in-depth analysis of Enlightenment thought is beyond the scope of this thesis, I have drawn from
thinkers including Friedrich Engels (Anti-Dühring, 1878), Max Weber (“Science as a Vocation,” 1918), Michael
Foucault (The Order of Things, 1966), Morris Berman (The Reenchantment of the World, 1981), Bruno Latour (We
Have Never Been Modern, 1993), and Horkheimer and Adorno (Dialectic of Enlightenment, 2002) all of whom have
thoroughly illuminated the assessment that the objective stance has tended—in contrast to the presumably
progressive intentions of Enlightenment-era projects in general—to perpetuate “a feedback loop of increasing
disconnection” (Deborah Bird Rose quoted in Escobar 2018,99).
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of fortune become elements of misfortune” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002,xviii-xix). Some of the
same factors that led to what may be considered the heights of human achievement and
progress, when carried to their utmost extreme, are evidently leading to human-caused
devastation on a planetary scale. Indeed, rigorous, evidence-based methodology is now yielding
proof that the effects of rampant industrialization are profoundly altering planet-wide
biogeochemical processes.16 The sixth mass extinction event in Earth’s history17—and the first
one catalyzed by human activity—is currently underway at approximately 1,000 times the rate
that would occur were human activity not a factor.18,19,20 To paraphrase Frederick Engels, Rosa
Luxemburg, and Horkheimer and Adorno in a single formulation: “enlightened civilization” is
rapidly descending into barbarism (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002,xix). 21

16

According to the Stockholm Resilience Centre, due to human activity four of nine “Planetary Boundaries” have
been crossed as of 2015. The nine boundaries are: stratospheric ozone depletion, biodiversity loss and extinctions,
chemical pollution and the release of novel entities, climate change, ocean acidification, freshwater consumption
and the global hydrological cycle, land system change (from forest to industrial agriculture, for example), nitrogen
and phosphorus flows to the biosphere and oceans (from industrial and agricultural practices), and atmospheric
aerosol loading. https://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/research-news/2015-01-15-planetary-boundaries--an-update.html/. Accessed November 7, 2019.
17 Prior to the current extinction event, five dramatic and rapid losses in biodiversity (“The Big Five”) can be seen in
the fossil record of marine invertebrates over the past 500 million years. See “Dynamics of origination and
extinction in the marine fossil record” by John Alroy in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2556405/. Accessed November 5, 2019.
18 On May 6, 2019, the UN Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services
(IPBES) published a report stating a million species are under threat of extinction and calling for major shifts in
policy, trade, infrastructure, and economics. See: “Summary for policymakers of the global assessment report
on biodiversity and ecosystem services of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services”:
https://www.ipbes.net/sites/default/files/downloads/spm_unedited_advance_for_posting_htn.pdf/Accessed May
9, 2019.
19 “Biological annihilation via the ongoing sixth mass extinction signaled by vertebrate population losses and
declines.” Gerardo Ceballos, Paul Ehrlich, and Rodolfo Dirzo in PNAS July 25, 2017, 114 (30) E6089-E6096; First
published July 10, 2017.
20 “The biodiversity of species and their rates of extinction, distribution, and protection,” S.L. Pimm et al. in
Science. May 30, 2014: Vol. 344, Issue 6187, 1246752.
21 “The Origin of Rosa Luxemburg’s Slogan ‘Socialism or Barbarism’” by Ian Angus in Monthly Review, October 22,
2014. https://climateandcapitalism.com/2014/10/22/origin-rosa-luxemburgs-slogan-socialism-barbarism/.
Accessed October 26, 2019.
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The willful abstraction of humans from nature can be traced to early empiricists such as
seventeenth-century French mathematician and philosopher René Descartes, an influential
progenitor of the view that the physical universe is composed of inert particles colliding at
random (Bortoft 2012,45). The use of apparatuses such as telescopes and microscopes along with
mathematical formulas to describe physical phenomena such as gravitation, electromagnetism,
and conservation of mass offered powerful new insights that allowed humans to examine and
manipulate the world around them in unprecedented ways, while serving to reinforce the
impression that the universe is less like a living thing and more akin to a machine.

The “mechanical philosophy” that emerged from the Scientific Revolution (the time period
preceding the Enlightenment when the empiricism of Copernicus, Galileo, Bacon, Newton,
Kepler, Descartes, and other European men was beginning to take hold22) through the
Enlightenment took a deterministic position, comparing the universe to the predictable workings
of a clock. An example is contained in the opening lines of Thomas Hobbes’ 1651 Leviathan: “For

what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so
many wheels…” (Hobbes 1886 [1651],5). German astronomer Johannes Kepler declared in

Steven Shapin opens his 1996 book The Scientific Revolution on page one with, “There was no such thing as the
Scientific Revolution, and this is a book about it.” Shapin points out that most historical works about events
associated with this period in history make the claim that “it was a Good Thing, and it happened sometime during
the period from the late sixteenth to the early eighteenth century.” His take is that there is room to discuss the
Scientific Revolution less as a distinct historical event and more as an examination of what cultural practices were
involved in knowledge production at the time. I will go on to use the term Scientific Revolution, as well as The
Enlightenment, while keeping this valid critique in mind.
22

19

1605 “the machine of the universe is not similar to a divine animated being, but similar to a
clock” (Kepler in Shapin 1996,33).

Twentieth-century biologists and social theorists Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin
describe how in the Cartesian view, as in the mechanistic conception, the parts of a thing are
always separate and pre-exist the whole:
In the Cartesian world, that is, the world as a clock, phenomena are the consequences
of the coming together of individual atomistic bits, each with its own intrinsic
properties, determining the behavior of the system as a whole. Lines of causality run
from part to whole, from atom to molecule, from molecule to organism, from
organism to collectivity (Levins and Lewontin 1985,2).

According to cultural historian Morris Berman, prior to the onset of the Scientific Revolution, a
less linear, more integrated perception of interrelationship with one’s surroundings was
common:
Rocks, trees, rivers, and clouds were all seen as wondrous, alive, and human beings felt
at home in this environment. The cosmos, in short, was a place of belonging. A member
of this cosmos was not an alienated observer of it but a direct participant in its drama. His
personal destiny was bound up with its destiny, and this relationship gave meaning to his
life (Berman 1981,16).
Berman refers to this kind of mindset, one in which everyone and everything is experienced as
an engaged agent, as a form of “participating consciousness” (Berman 1981,16).

Seeking to demonstrate the significance of such organic, sensitive, participatory approaches as
positivist epistemologies were becoming predominant in post-Enlightenment Europe, a cadre of
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thinkers including Alexander von Humboldt, Fredrich Engels,

20

and Rosa Luxemburg (quoted in the opening epigraphs) wanted to show the objective and the
subjective are not mutually exclusive; in fact, in any efforts to interpret one’s experience of the
world, these approaches are dynamic and essential complements. By illuminating the inherent
interdependence of peoples, regions, and ecological systems, many of the Romantics arguably
intended to subvert a trend toward placing humans apart from and above an externalized
“nature,” and, by extension, the use of science and “logic” to justify compartmentalization,
dehumanization, exploitation, and hierarchy.

The word “disenchantment” has been used to describe the atmosphere of the collective mental
shift catalyzed in the midst of the European Age of Enlightenment when all knowledge, even that
derived from direct personal experience through the senses, was suddenly subject to
mathematization in order to be accepted as valid. Max Weber stated in his 1918 “Science as a
Vocation” lecture, “The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and
intellectualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world.'” 23 Weber well
understood the very same principles ostensibly intended to “enlighten” could be negated by
replacing the transcendent with the mechanistic (Tucker 1992,17).

German explorer-biogeographer Alexander von Humboldt was one of the first naturalists in the
Romantic movement to offer, by contrast, a view of life that is dynamic, web-like:
Nature considered rationally, that is to say, submitted to the process of thought, is a unity
in diversity of phenomena; a harmony, blending together all created things however
dissimilar in form and attributes; one great whole, animated by the breath of life. The
23

Max Weber, 1918, “Science as a Vocation.”
http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~oded/X/WeberScienceVocation.pdf. Accessed December 29, 2019.
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most important result of a rational inquiry into nature is, therefore, to establish that unity
and harmony of this stupendous mass of force and matter, to determine with impartial
justice what is due to the discoveries of the past and to those of the present, and to
analyze the individual parts of natural phenomena without succumbing beneath the
weight of the whole (Emphasis the author’s. Humboldt 1858,24).24

Humboldt’s slightly elder colleague Goethe was another prominent European thinker who
foresaw the detrimental potential of the analytical mode of thought/human-nature separation
on his fellow Europeans’ propensity to regard the world at large—including fellow humans and
other inhabitants they deemed less intelligent, deserving, or otherwise inferior—as objects to be
mined and controlled (Bortoft 1996,111). Near the turn of the nineteenth century he proposed a
method to supplement the objective stance central to conventional science: Goethe’s “delicate
empiricism,” or zarte Empirie, is a way of becoming familiar with a phenomenon by embedding
oneself within it. Goethe proposed, “There is a delicate empiricism which makes itself utterly
identical with the object, thereby becoming a true theory” (Goethe in Seamon and Zajonc
1998,11). He believed:
In living nature, nothing happens that is not in connection with a whole. When
experiences appear to us in isolation or when we look at experiments as presenting only
24

In 1800, over half-a-century prior to conveying the sentiment above, Humboldt visited a devastated region near
Lake Valencia in Venezuela. His descriptions of the effects of deforestation and resulting erosion and depletion of
fresh water and fertile land caused by colonial plantations are among the earliest documented acknowledgements
of human-caused damages to regional ecosystems and the resulting interrelated cascade of negative effects:
By felling the trees that cover the tops and sides of the mountains men everywhere have ensured two
calamities at the same time for the future: lack of fuel, and scarcity of water. Trees, by the nature of their
perspiration, and in the radiation from their leaves in a cloudless sky, surround themselves with an
atmosphere that is constantly cool and misty. They affect the amount of springs by sheltering the soil
from the sun’s direct actions and reducing the rainwater’s evaporation. When forests are destroyed, as
they are everywhere in America by European planters, with imprudent haste, the springs dry up
completely, or merely trickle. Riverbeds remain dry during part of the year and are then turned into
torrents whenever it rains heavily on the heights. As grass and moss disappear with the brushwood from
the mountainsides, so rainwater is unchecked in its course. Instead of slowly raising the river level by
filtrations, the heavy rains dig channels into the hillsides, dragging down loose soil, and forming sudden,
destructive floods. Thus, the clearing of forests, the absence of permanent springs, and torrents are three
closely connected phenomena (Humboldt 1814 [1995],150-151).
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isolated facts, that is not to say that the facts are indeed isolated…since everything in
nature, especially the more common forces and elements, is in eternal action and
reaction, we can say of every phenomenon that it is connected to countless others, just
as a radiant point of light sends out its rays in all directions (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
2010[1792],22-23).

For Goethe, the researcher is at all times separate from and entangled with the subject of study;
the quantitative and qualitative exist simultaneously and are of comparable value. When Goethe
looked at a plant, for example, he viewed its various observable parts not as static, separate
entities, but rather as the fleeting artifacts of a larger ongoing process he referred to as the “urphenomenon” (Urphänomen) (Seamon and Zajonc 1998,4).

While Karl Marx and Frederick Engels were adolescents when their prominent countryman
Goethe died in 1832, some of the pair’s writings echo their elder’s social and scientific
philosophies. As has been persuasively argued by John Bellamy Foster and Paul Burkett in Marx
and the Earth: An Anti-Critique (2016), Marx and Engels were conscious of the potential social
impact of a worldview that strategically separates humans from an external “nature.” Marx
stated in The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844:
Just as plants, animals, stones, air, light, etc. on the theoretical side form part of human
consciousness, partly as objects of natural science, partly as objects of art, just as they are
his spiritual inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment which he must first prepare for
enjoyment and digestion, so they also form a part of human life and of human activity on
the practical side. Physically man lives only by these products of nature, whether they
appear in the form of food, heating, clothes, housing, etc. The universality of man appears
in practice precisely in that universality which makes the whole of nature his inorganic
body, insofar as nature is (1) a direct means to life, and (2) the material, object and
instrument of his life activity. Nature is man’s inorganic body—nature, i.e., in so far as it
is not the human body. Man lives by nature. This means that nature is his body, with which
he must constantly remain in step if he is not to die. That man’s physical and spiritual life
is tied to nature means no more than that nature is tied to itself, for man is part of nature
(Emphasis the author’s. Marx 1844 [1983],138).
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The above text alludes to what Foster has come to describe as Marx’s theory of “metabolic rift,”
the idea that humans and every element of the environment act in concert as a superorganism,
and regarding nature as an externality—an infinite “resource” to be freely seized and heedlessly
fouled in the interest of maximizing profit for industrialists—leads to compounding imbalances
(Foster 2018). Marx pointed to depletion of soil fertility as an example of how the metabolism of
an ecosystem, much like a human metabolism, can become exhausted by overwork and dearth
of restorative input (Foster and Clark 2018). In the prescient words of Engels:
…in nature nothing takes place in isolation. Everything affects every other thing and viceversa, and it is mostly because this all-sided motion and interaction is forgotten that our
natural scientists are prevented from clearly seeing the simplest things…at every step we
are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign
people, like someone standing outside nature––but that we, with flesh, blood, and brain
belong to nature, and exist in its midst…(Frederick Engels 1883 in Merchant 1994,42).

For Engels, not only is human metabolism inseparable from the functioning of the ecological
systems within which all is situated, he went on to proclaim “…the human essence is no
abstraction inherent in each single individual…In reality it is the ensemble of human relations”
(Engels 1886). Said another way, unlike the mid-twentieth-century existentialist formulation
“existence precedes essence,”25 Engels is stating the existence and essence of an “individual” is
constantly and actively co-constituted based on relations occurring in lived experience. French
philosopher Etienne Balibar claims Marx (presumably in ensemble with Engels):
…reject[s] both the individualist point of view (primacy of the individual and, especially,
the fiction of an individuality which could be defined in itself, in isolation, whether in
25

This statement was famously articulated by Jean-Paul Sartre during a lecture titled “Existentialism is a
Humanism” in 1946.
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm. Accessed November 19, 2019.
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terms of biology, psychology, economic behaviour, or whatever), and the organicist point
of view (which, today, following Anglo-American usage, is also called the holistic point of
view: the primacy of the whole, and particularly of society considered as an indivisible
unity of which individuals are merely the functional members). Marx will embrace neither
the ‘monad’ of Hobbes and Bentham, nor the ‘grand être’ of Auguste Comte. It is
significant that Marx (who spoke French almost as fluently as he did German) should have
resorted to the foreign word ‘ensemble’ here, clearly in order to avoid using the German
‘das Ganze’, the ‘whole’ or totality (Emphasis the author’s. Balibar 1995,30).

Balibar goes on to suggest “transindividuality,” a term not used by Marx but employed later by
Lacan and others, may be most appropriate in describing a kind of identity that can only exist in
an endlessly transforming and transformative state—a “permanent revolution”—among
“individuals by dint of their multiple interactions” (Balibar 1995,32-33).

The notion of a continuously co-constituted “transindividual” can pertain to any being, not just
human. The turn-of-the-nineteenth-century Naturphilosophie of Goethe’s colleague Friedrich
Schelling, for example, perceived the whole of existence as entangled, with each seemingly
particular thing only definable relative to everything else. Harvard English professor James Engell
describes Schelling’s Naturephilosophie as such:
Each thing that comes into existence does so by paying a kind of homage to the things
surrounding it. For example, a rose bush wrenched absolutely from its environment
cannot live. Alone, the rose is absurd. Everything in the cosmos interconnects with its
immediate surroundings, and those surroundings with wider environs, until the world,
the solar system, and more are included. Things necessarily exist through and by other
things. This universal ecology has a dynamic character. Even time and space are functions
of energy, motion, and matter. The identity of everything is thus in relationship to
everything else. Nature is the birth of ideas. Every natural object is thus potentially a
symbol of the spirit or of natura naturans [nature naturing26], a meeting point of the
eternal and the temporal, the universal and the particular (Engell 1984,315).

26

Though this Latin term has been in use since the Middle Ages, it brings to mind “matter mattering” in the Karen
Baradian sense, to be described in Chapter Three.

25

It was not until 1866 that zoologist and artist Ernst Haeckel, another German naturalist to emerge
from within the Romantic tradition, coined the word “ecology” by combining the Greek words
oikos (home) and logy (study) to describe a “comprehensive science of the relationships of the
organism to its surrounding environment, where we can include, in the broader sense, all
‘conditions of existence’ (Haeckel 1866,286).”27 Ecology was an inclusive approach that
challenged reductionistic epistemologies and embraced “the whole vast interconnection of
things” that Engels (among others) recognized was perilously lacking in Enlightenment-era
science.

While we can envision ourselves as made up of parts like a machine, it is also possible to imagine
the ways in which we are like the rose, unable to exist outside a rich matrix that includes soil,
water, pollinators, and sunlight. The imagination can serve as a powerful source of evidence that
dualisms between humans and nature, mind and body, self and other, etc., are human-devised
conceptual and linguistic tools rather than concrete conditions of being.28
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While Haeckel is often credited as the coiner of the term “ecology,” it must be also noted that he was an
advocate for a scientific basis for racism. One example from his oeuvre:
If one must draw a sharp boundary between other primates and humans, it has to be drawn between the
most highly developed and civilized man on the one hand, and the rudest savages on the other, and the
latter have to be classed with the animals. This is, in fact, the opinion of many travelers, who have long
watched the lowest human races in their native countries. Thus for example, a great English traveler, who
lived for a considerable time on the West Coast of Africa, says: ‘I consider the negro to be a lower species
of man, and cannot make up my mind to look upon him as a man and a brother, for the gorilla would then
also have to be admitted in to the family’ (Haeckel 1884,365).
28 Twentieth-century theoretical physicist David Bohm theorized:
In essence, the process of division is a way of thinking about things that is convenient and useful mainly in
the domain of practical, technical, and functional activities (e.g., to divide up an area of land into different
fields where various crops are to be grown). However, when this mode of thought is applied more broadly
to man’s notion of himself and the whole world in which he lives (i.e. to his self-world view), then man
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To reiterate, it was not the entire project of empirical science, per se, that the Romantics and
others were wary of; conceptual detachment from a subject of study in order to achieve the most
empirical, unbiased analysis possible was undeniably an extraordinary innovation, one which has
led to innumerable developments in a wide range of fields including engineering, medicine, and
agriculture. Indeed, this same rigorous, evidence-based methodology is now yielding proof that
the effects of rampant industrialization are profoundly altering planet-wide biogeochemical
processes. Rather, it was scientism—the idea that empirical methods are the only valid source of
knowledge and all problems social, technological, or even philosophical can be solved
quantitatively—that they found problematic.29 Troubled by the assumption that an individual can
be wholly removed from an experiment, they viewed objectivity as a useful model but a practical
impossibility. Not seen as unique to humans, personal creativity was taken to be the experience
of the same force from which all aspects of the universe emerge. The Romantics recognized the
potential limitations of mechanistic thinking and, through embracing the senses and the
imagination, “offered another, complementary path into the deep structures of reality” (Richards
2002,xvii).30

ceases to regard the resulting divisions as merely useful or convenient and begins to see and experience
himself and his world as actually constituted of separately existent fragments (Bohm 1980,2-3).
29

As instigated by Galileo Galilei and Giordano Bruno in the 1500s, carried forth by Descartes in the 1600s, and
leveraged by Thomas Henry Huxley (1758) and Comte de Buffon (1807) in the 1700s and 1800s.
30 Incidentally, the path taken by the Romantics, in bearing elements in common with “enchanted” pre- and nonEnlightenment thinking, was not an entirely original one. I return to non-reductionist ways of viewing the world
derived (or perhaps, more accurately, appropriated) by Europeans from outside the European purview in the
section on the Surrealist artists of the mid-twentieth century.
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In The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism (1981), Engell expounds upon the
concept of imagination and how the effort to understand and cultivate it influenced all aspects
of culture during and immediately following the European “Age of Reason.” Engell confirms it
was in part rebellion against detached rationalism and embracing of creative expression as a vital
form of knowledge production that drove the movement towards Romanticism in literature, art,
philosophy, and science. In response to a “reasonable,” rational way of looking at the world that
reduced nature to something external and material—essentially varying forms of data—the
Romantics saw creativity as intimate participation in the unfolding of nature itself (Engell 1981):
The Romantics were not denouncing the whole eighteenth century; they wanted to
repudiate certain aspects of thought and literary practice, especially those associated
with neoclassic formalism, materialist theories of mind and body, and atomistic
philosophy…The creative imagination became the way to unify man’s psyche and, by
extension, to reunify man with nature…The new concept of the imagination enlarged the
humanities and increased the expectations placed on secular art, and the promise and
burden of those expectations continue today (Engell 1981,5-8).

The emotional, ethical, qualitative dimensions that the humanities can lend to quantitative
science without diminishing science’s effectiveness as a mode of knowledge-production indeed
continues to hold great promise and weight. The perilous state of early twenty-first-century
global ecology offers ample evidence that Romantic Naturalists were justified in their assessment
that perceived human detachment from nature coupled with diminished regard for the value of
subjective, aesthetic engagement would ultimately prove devastating.

Why did their view not come to predominate? Several factors, I speculate, contributed to the
lack of acceptance of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, Goethe’s delicate empiricism, Marx and
Engels’ metabolic rift, and Humboldt’s web of life alongside quantitative modes of scientific
28

inquiry. First, to accept humans as part of nature and all entities and processes as interrelated,
interdependent, and worthy of consideration in the interest of a common good posed (and
continues to pose) an obstacle to those in positions of power tempted by nearer-term profit from
extraction, exploitation, and colonization. According to Morris Berman:
…the forces that triumphed in the second half of the seventeenth century were those of
bourgeois ideology and laissez-faire capitalism. Not only was the idea of living matter
heresy to such groups; it was also economically inconvenient. A dead earth [sic] ruptures
the delicate ecological balance that was maintained in the alchemical [preEnlightenment] tradition, but if nature is dead, there are no restraints on exploiting it for
profit…indeed, it is no more difficult [or rational] to visualize the earth as a living organism
than it is to see it as a dead, mechanical object (Berman 1981,126).

The military-industrial complex, large-scale commercial agriculture, and the fossil fuel industries,
to name three prominent examples, could not exist in their current forms if metabolic rift were
taken into account. Related to this is the great practical—and profitable—efficacy of positivist
readings of science; i.e.: empirical methods undeniably function powerfully and effectively.31 An
additional factor is that arguments in favor of subjectivity, in sometimes seeming to skirt proanimistic/vitalistic realms, can become mired by implications of mysticism and cul-de-sac
examinations of the nature of mind and consciousness which are tangential to the point that a
humancentric model of the biosphere is an improvident construction. Berman stresses it is a
relatively recent (though uniquely devastating) one, and proposes a solution:
For more than 99 percent of human history, the world was enchanted and man saw
himself as an integral part of it. The complete reversal of this perception in a mere four
hundred years or so has destroyed the human psyche. It has very nearly wrecked the

31

As I have tried to emphasize, and as Goethe scholar Henri Bortoft has pointed out, critiques of positivist science
do not suggest that Western science is invalid. Bortoft says, “Of course [science] is true. But it’s not the only
possibility, and for as long as we think it is we will be unable to transform our understanding of our relationship
with nature, instead of just tinkering with it at the edges” (Bortoft 2012,52). A fundamental tenet of this thesis is
that there is no time left to tinker.
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planet as well. The only hope, or so it seems to me, lies in a reenchantment of the world
(Berman 1981,23).

As will be explored in the following chapter, social ecologists, new materialists, and some in the
fields of biology and physics are currently working along lines of thinking that share concerns in
common with “re-enchanters”32 of the Romantic era. Related questions are being raised: Is it
more constructive for humans to perceive ourselves as disinterested observers, outside of and
above an externalized nature, or is intra-dependence a more prudent mindset? Is it possible to
grasp the contrasting and complementary values of both stances simultaneously, selecting the
position best suited to the task at hand while keeping ethical considerations firmly in mind?

Let us compare the radically relational countercurrent of the Romantic Naturalists with
contemporary topics in science and philosophy.
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More on enchantment, disenchantment, mis-enchantment, and re-enchantment in Chapter Four.
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3. SOCIAL ECOLOGY, AGENTIAL REALISM, AND THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR AN INTRA-ACTIVE
IMAGINARY
In this chapter, I explore ontologies of intra-dependence that have emerged in the fields of social
ecology, microbiology, physics, and post humanist philosophy in the mid-to late-twentieth
century. Each from different angles, these interdisciplinary approaches pose challenges to
science’s earlier, more compartmentalized definitions of life, species, and what it means to be
human.

The concept of social ecology—the idea that ecological crises are rooted in destructive sociopolitical ideologies and institutions as alluded to by Engels, Luxemburg, Haeckel, and others—
was formalized in the 1960s by theorist Murray Bookchin (Bookchin 1963):
Social ecology is based on the conviction that nearly all of our present ecological problems
originate in deep-seated social problems. It follows, from this view, that these ecological
problems cannot be understood, let alone solved, without a careful understanding of our
existing society and the irrationalities that dominate it. To make this point more concrete:
economic, ethnic, cultural, and gender conflicts, among many others, lie at the core of
the most serious ecological dislocations we face today (Bookchin 2007).

Philosopher John P. Clark states, “One essential task of social ecology is to contribute to an
ecological imaginary.” He believes:
The image of the earth as “Home,” or planetary household, and humans as members of
the earth community has great imaginary power…In pursuing this vision, social ecology
realizes its deepest meaning as a reflection on the earth household, a reflection that
reveals our place as companions in our common journey (Clark 1998).

Home, oikos, is place plus memories and experiences commonly involving kindred inhabitants.
Under ideal circumstances, home might be associated with a sense of belonging and
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shelteredness. As Gaston Bachelard declared in his canonical Poetics of Space, “Inhabited space
transcends geometrical space” (Bachelard 1969,47).33

While the expectation that everyone can experience a shared feeling of the earth as a planetary
household and its inhabitants as a community may seem somewhat utopian from the standpoint
of current global affairs, I argue this is a condition worth striving toward.34 That such an oikoslogical condition could seem improbable if not impossible could be considered a crisis of
imagination.35,36,37 But imagination can be cultivated (as I examine in depth in following chapters)
and social imaginaries can shift. For evidence of such, we can turn to pivotal moments throughout
history when scientific discoveries elicited profound alterations in the way peoples imagine
themselves.38 The effect of the Copernican Revolution on sixteenth-century European thought is
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In Chapter twelve of Mark Twain’s The Innocents Abroad, the narrator mentions in passing that there does not
seem to be a word in French that captures the essence of the English word “home”; the commonly-used chez nous,
“with us” or “at our place” is not quite the same. While I too have long pondered this very question, Dr. Winifred
Lambrecht, one of my thesis advisors and a native French speaker, suggests that le foyer has a similar meaning.
With its root in the word feu, or fire, le foyer conjures up images of the hearth and connotes all of the unique
characteristics of a region, from features of the landscape and architecture to traditional types of food and drink.
Still, I find it curious that the word “home” does not appear once in the English translation of The Poetics of Space.
(Twain’s The Innocents Abroad: https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/t/twain/mark/innocents/chapter12.html
Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space: https://sites.evergreen.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/88/2015/05/GastonBachelard-the-Poetics-of-Space.pdf. Both links accessed November 19, 2019.)
34 According to a 1978 speech, Murray Bookchin felt similarly: “Without that community and without that sense of
home, without that sense of the organic—of the organic and the developmental rather than the mere inorganic
and ‘change’ in which you merely change place—you are changing nothing, the problems are merely amplified or
diminished, but they remain the same problems.”
http://unevenearth.org/2019/10/bookchin_doing_the_impossible/ Accessed October 27, 2019
35 Among the famed slogans from the May 1968 student/worker protests in Paris was “Be Realistic: Demand the
Impossible” (“Soyez réalistes, demandez l’impossible”). Another was “Power to the imagination” (“L’imagination au
pouvoir”).
36 On page two of his 2009 book Capitalist Realism, Mark Fisher attributes the famed phrase, “It is easier to
imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism” to both Fredrick Jameson and Slavoj Zizek.
37 Antidotes to this condition will be offered in Chapters Four and Five.
38 While I am specifically exploring examples of the ways scientific knowledge generated in earnest impacts/has
impacted social imaginaries at large, it must be pointed out that billions of dollars are spent to use science to
manipulate public opinion in destructive ways. See Justin Farrell’s 2016 paper “Network Structure and Influence on
the Climate Change Counter Movement” in Nature Climate Change 6, 370-374. DOI: 10.1038/nclimate2875

32

an apt example, as it demonstrates the dramatic impact of a scientific concept on a population’s
general perception of itself and its culture at large.

In 1543, with the publication of De revolutionibus orbium coelestium (On the Revolutions of the
Heavenly Spheres), Copernicus convincingly theorized that Earth, situated in an infinite cosmos,
revolves around the sun. The heliocentric model definitively unseated the previous geocentric
(Earth-centered) Aristotelian/Ptolemaic model favored by the Catholic Church, by whose logic
humanity must be located on a unique planet at the center of a finite universe created especially
for it by God. The heliocentric model challenged “the earth’s uniqueness, abolished the
terrestrial-celestial distinction, and suggested the infinity of the universe” (Kuhn 1957,237). By
1633 when the Church refused to accept additional evidence of the sun-centered model
produced by Galileo and others, due in large part to the influence of poets and communicators
outside the field of science, the popular imagination had already shifted (Kuhn 1957,190).

While displacing Earth from the center of a finite universe was, at the time, a profoundly
impactful concept, Enlightenment thought did not, however, go on to decenter humans or
resituate them as equal actors amidst a teeming plethora of phenomena (in fact, Copernicus’
theories, while they decentered Earth, instead positioned the core of the universe at our sun,
not, on the scale of the universe, substantively farther away; rather, the Baconian-CartesianNewtonian view placed humans outside—and above—an externalized “nature” with some

https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate2875 Accessed November 19, 2019.
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humans—coincidently, those most similar in appearance, thought, and social strata to the
developers of the system—occupying a loftier place in the hierarchy than others) (Kuhn 1957).

As I will proceed to demonstrate, the push for a new conceptual shift that challenges the humancentric model of the biosphere is currently underway across (and outside of) disciplinary
bounds.39

Contemporary biologists are reexamining long-held paradigms, such as the general notion that
concepts like “life” and “species” are clear-cut. It is now well-known that human beings are not
discreet, autonomous entities; approximately half the cells in our bodies are microorganisms that
play critical roles in the immune system, brain function, and genetic make-up (Sender, Fuchs,
Milo 2016). In addition to having profound implications within the fields of biology and medicine,
recent revelations in science may have the capacity to affect the way humans think of ourselves
in general. The microbiome plays key roles in cognitive function and behavior, immune
response/disease resistance, and digestion. The genetic composition of the microbiome also
contributes “orders of magnitude more genes” to an individual than an individual’s own DNA,
affecting metabolism and the uptake of nutrients and medicines. “The microbiome is not
‘influencing’ the genome; it is co-constituting the metaorganisms that we humans are” (Rees,
Bosch, Douglas 2018,4):
The human is not a unitary entity but a dynamic and interactive community of human
cells and microbial cells. The realization that humans are not individual, discrete entities
One crucial difference between the present revolution and the Copernican one is that much life on Earth will
soon cease to exist in its current form if a revolutionarily interdependent mode of thought does not prove
sufficiently influential.
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but rather the outcome of ever-changing interactions with microorganisms has
consequences beyond the biological disciplines. In particular, it calls into question the
assumption that distinctive human traits set us apart from all other animals—and
therefore also the traditional disciplinary divisions between the arts and sciences (Rees,
Bosch, Douglas 2018,1).

These authors are making the claim that by calling into question the human sense of “self,” the
implications for microbiome science are seeping outside the bounds of biology and into the realm
of the humanities, and into culture at large.

Studies confirming humans are essentially “a community of human cells and microbial cells” and
“our ancestors were multi-organismal before they were multicellular” are still gaining acceptance
within scientific circles (Rees, Bosch, Douglas 2018,2), but the groundwork was laid over 100
years ago when similar ideas were even less well-received.

First suggested by Russian scientist Konstantin Sergeivich Mereschkovsky in 1910, evolutionary
biologist Lynn Margulis (formerly Sagan) is noted for a concept known as symbiogenesis, or
endosymbiotic theory (Sagan 1967, Aanen and Eggleton 2017). Symbiosis occurs when organisms
of different species cooperate to the benefit of all involved (lichens, for example, which consist
of a composite of algae and fungus) (Hall 1966,110). Symbiogenesis—which can be literally
translated as becoming by living together—is the idea that symbiosis, over time, can lead to the
merging of organisms into a single taxonomic classification (Aanen and Eggleton 2017). In the
mid-1960s, Margulis work was widely ridiculed when she proposed the organelles of eukaryotic
cells (those found in multi-cellular plants, animals, and fungi having a membrane-bound,
chromosome-containing nucleus) were once free-living prokaryotes (single-celled organisms,
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namely bacteria, containing a single, circular strand of DNA and no membrane-enclosed
organelles) that had merged to form a symbiotic unit. While her prediction that symbiogenesis
would come to be taken as major driver of evolutionary innovation alongside mutation, selection,
and drift did not come to pass, the idea that cooperative complexes of organisms can become
joined is now widely accepted (Gray 2017, Aanen and Eggleton 2017).

An emerging field of anthropology called multispecies ethnography looks at the ways humanness shapes and is shaped by a diversity of organisms, and the ways those organisms are
described, classified, and potentially communicated with by humans. This developing discipline
is concerned with “‘becomings’—new kinds of relations emerging from nonhierarchical alliances,
symbiotic attachments, and the mingling of creative agents” (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010,546).
Anthropologist Eben Kirksey cites “companion species” such as certain mutualistic figs, wasps,
and the parasites living within wasp bodies that become “intimately entangled”; none can survive
without the other, bringing into question where one organism begins and another ends (Kirksey
2015).

Similar ideas are raised in Deleuze and Guattari’s 1980 A Thousand Plateaus in which the authors
speak of the “rhizome” formed by “wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements” (Deleuze and
Guatarri 1987,10).40 In the same work, Deleuze and Guattari also discuss the ways in which
intricate inter-being assemblages are “becomings”—creatures affected by one another and
developing within that relation (Deleuze and Guttari 1987,256-258). Kirksey proposes the way a
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In plant biology, a rhizome is the horizontally-growing stem of a plant from which roots and shoots can form.
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banyan tree grows may be an even more apt metaphor for mutualistic “becomings” than the
rhizome, as “Banyans can become mosaic organisms—when branches or roots of two plants
touch, they slowly explore the possibility of physiological fusion” (Kirksey 2015). Both the
rhizome and the banyan evoke organic, networked modes of being that can be visualized in the
mind’s eye and compared against hierarchical social imaginaries consisting of isolated entities.

Native North American philosopher of science Kim Tallbear points out such views, while
innovative from within the purview of conventional modern science, are not necessarily unique
from the standpoint of Indigenous peoples:
The recent move to ‘multi-species ethnography’ applies anthropological approaches to
studying humans and their relations with non-human-beings such as dogs, bears, cattle,
monkeys, bees, mushrooms, and microorganisms. Such work is both methodologically
and ethically innovative in that it highlights how organisms’ livelihoods are co-constituted
with cultural, political, and economic forces. But the field has starting points that only
partially contain indigenous [sic] standpoints. First of all, indigenous [sic] peoples have
never forgotten that nonhumans are agential beings engaged in social relations that
profoundly shape human lives. In addition, for many indigenous [sic] peoples, nonhuman
others may not be understood even in critical Western frameworks as living. ‘Objects’ and
‘forces’ such as stones, thunder, or stars are known within our ontologies to be sentient
and knowing persons (this is where new materialisms intersect with animal studies)
(Tallbear 2015:234).

Even within Western frameworks, the definitions of “life” and “species” are not as
straightforward as they are often made out to be. Theoretical physicist David Bohm suggests the
line between life and non-life cannot be rigidly defined, even by science:
As the plant is formed, maintained, and dissolved by exchange of matter and energy with
its environment, at which point can we say that there is a sharp distinction between what
is alive and what is not? Clearly, a molecule of carbon dioxide that crosses a cell boundary
into a leaf does not suddenly ‘come alive’ nor does a molecule of oxygen suddenly ‘die’
when it is released into the atmosphere (Bohm 1980,194).
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As we are seeing, boundaries between life and non-life or one species and another, verified by
the methods of science, can just as easily be challenged using the very same methods. An
examination of taxonomy, the science of naming, reveals distinctions between living things are
less rigid material conditions than matters of expediency. The binomial nomenclature system
consisting of a standardized set of Latin words used to indicate genus (generic) and species
(specific) of a biological organism based mainly on the somewhat unreliable metric of
morphology (outward appearance)—came into the form still dominant today at the hand of
Swedish physician and botanist Carl Linnaeus with his Critica Botanica in 1737.41 The rush to
establish a standardized taxonomic system was largely to aid “bioprospecting” efforts in service
to the mission of European colonization.42

According to Michel Foucault, prior to the imposing of a consistent classification system, the
language used in describing organisms was more richly expressive and regionally specific, as
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Incidentally, it was Carl Linneaus who in 1758 named humans Homo sapiens, meaning “wise man.” In the August
17, 2011 journal Nature Australian science writer Julian Cribb proposed that, in light of humanity’s capacity for
destruction, the name should be updated. According to Cribb, “We should be formally renamed to more accurately
describe a species that is: exterminating thousands of others; releasing carbon, nitrogen and phosphorus in
amounts exceeding Earth's natural cycles; devoting 50 times more resources to making weapons than to sustaining
the food supply; destroying forests; degrading soil; polluting water; pillaging the oceans; and damaging the
atmosphere on a planetary scale.” https://www.nature.com/articles/476282b/ Accessed October 29, 2019. In his
1968 The Dehuminization of Art, José Ortega y Gasset suggests that Homo insciens or insipiens, “man the
unknowing” may be a more appropriate moniker (Ortega y Gasset 1968,194).
42 “The exact knowledge of nature was key to amassing national wealth, and hence power…botanists at this time
were ‘agents of empire’: their inventories, classifications, and transplantations were the vanguard and in some
cases the ‘instruments’ of European order…Peter Kalm, one of Carl Linnaeus’ students wrote from London in 1748:
‘Historia Naturalis is the base for all economics, commerce, and manufactures’…Like others at time, Linnaeus
taught that the purpose of natural history was to render service to the state” (Schiebinger 2004,5-11).
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created by populations intimately familiar with the habits, habitats, anatomy, medical and food
uses, and other qualities of local flora and fauna:
Until the time of Aldrovandi [1522-1605], history was the inextricable and completely
unitary fabric of all that was visible of things and of the signs that had been discovered or
lodged in them: to write the history of a plant or an animal was as much a matter of
describing its elements or organs as of describing the resemblances that could be found
in it, the virtues that it was thought to possess, the legends and stories with which it had
been involved, its place in heraldry, the medicaments that were concocted from its
substance, the foods it provided, what the ancients recorded of it, and what travelers
might have said of it. The history of a living being was that being itself, within the whole
semantic network that connected it to the world (Foucault 1966[1989],140).

The spread of the Linnaean “science of names” caused other knowledge-rich methods of
biological organizations (“folk taxonomies”) in practice around the globe to be devalued and
displaced, thereby further “assist[ing] in the consolidation of Western hegemony” (Schiebinger
2004,198). Aside from being an inexact science, it can also be argued that a system of scientific
classification based on hierarchy, while practical for communication purposes, reinforces an
impression that beings can legitimately be perceived as autonomous entities which are
inherently “higher” or “lower” in rank.43,44

In the 1980s, Bohm explained why the tendency to divide things into parts is both beneficial and
dangerous:
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Add to this the fact that Linnaeus saw fit to name many species, not based on any trait seemingly inherent in the
organism whatsoever, but rather after prominent European men: “What Linnaeus proposed was a naming system
abstract in relation to the properties of plants but concrete in relation to the history of botany in Europe: ‘as a
religious duty’ he intended ‘to engrave the names of men on plants, and to so secure them for immortal renown’”
(Schiebinger 2004,201).
44 An in-depth overview of the ways that the kind of science that emerged from the Enlightenment has been used
since the seventeenth century to justify racism is outside the scope of this paper. See Comte de Buffon’s 1758
Natural History and Thomas Jefferson’s 1785 “Notes on the State of Virginia” for examples.
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In essence, the process of division is a way of thinking about things that is convenient and
useful mainly in the domain of practical, technical and functional activities (e.g., to divide
up an area of land into different fields where various crops are to be grown). However,
when this mode of thought is applied more broadly to man’s notion of himself and the
whole world in which he lives (i.e., to his self-world view), then man ceases to regard the
resulting divisions as merely useful or convenient and begins to see and experience
himself as actually constituted of separately existent fragments…the widespread and
pervasive distinctions between people (race, nation, family, profession, etc.), which are
now preventing mankind from working together for the common good, and indeed, even
for survival, have one of the key factors of their origin in a kind of thought that treats
things as inherently divided (Emphasis the author’s. Bohm 1980,xi-3).

Biologist-philosophers Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin similarly expressed, “Cartesianism is
more than simply a method of investigation; it is a commitment to how things really are…In actual
practice, reduction as a methodology and reductionism as a world view feed on and recreate
each other” (Levins and Lewontin 1985,2). But as contemporary biologists are affirming, things
made up of detached parts that can exist in isolation, while sometimes convenient to imagine, is
not “how things really are.” Rather:
Parts and wholes evolve in consequence of their relationship, and the relationship itself
evolves. These are the properties of things we call dialectical; that one thing cannot exist
without the other, that one acquires its properties from its relation to the other, that the
properties of both evolve as a consequence of their interpenetration (Levins and
Lewontin 1985,3).

Levins and Lewontin critique “alienated science,” a reductionist view of the world presuming
wholes are composed of definable, pre-existent units. “Dialectical science,” in contrast, is the
view that “a whole is a relation of heterogeneous parts that have no prior independent existence
as parts” and “have no prior alienated existence but are acquired by being parts of a particular
whole…Part makes whole, whole makes part” (Emphasis the authors’. Levins and Lewontin
1985,272-273).
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Concepts (and associated entities) that Levins and Lewontin might refer to as “dialectical,”
contemporary feminist-physicist-philosopher Karen Barad may think of as “queer.” She uses
slime molds, colonies of amoebas, and even atoms to illustrate the amorphousness—the
“queerness”—of individual identity:
[Slime molds] have the ability to morph from a seemingly uncoordinated group of
genetically identical single cells to an aggregate ‘slug’ with an immune system, muscles
and nerves with ganglia (that is, simple brains) and other organismic functionality
characteristic of multicellular species with different roles played by identical cellular
units…Social amoebas queer the nature of identity, calling into question the
individual/group binary. In fact, when it comes to queering identity, the social amoeba
enjoys multiple indeterminacies, and has managed to hoodwink scientists’ ongoing
attempts to nail down its taxonomy, its species-being defying not only classification by
phylum but also by kingdom…I entertain the possibility of the queerness of one of the
most pervasive of all Earthlings: atoms. I dub them ‘ultraqueer’ critters due to the fact
that their quantum quotidian qualities queer queerness itself in their radically
deconstructive ways of being. Indeed, given that ‘queer’ is a radical questioning of identity
and binaries, including the nature/culture binary, I explain, based on a detailed
consideration of recent experimental findings, that all sorts of seeming impossibilities are
indeed possible, including the queerness of causality, matter, space, and time (Barad in
Kleinman 2012:81).

Though slime molds serve as an apt example of a critter that defies any human propensity to
construct identities that fit neatly into boxes, Barad does not stick to biology to back up her
points; she is also a physicist. In the above paragraph she segues smoothly from protists into the
behavior of atoms,45 a key to her philosophical framework.
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On page three of Barad’s 2007 Meeting the Universe Halfway she points out: “Even atoms, whose very name
atomos [in Greek], means ‘indivisible’ or ‘uncuttable,’ can be broken apart.” I would like to point out the word
“individual” started out in late Middle English as the word “indivisible.” In Latin “in” means “not” and “dividuus”
means “divisible.” Dividuus is a conjugation of the verb “divider,” “to divide.” Is it the individual that cannot be
divided, or the individual that cannot be divided from the whole? Later, I look at Barad’s idea of the “agential cut,”
which “cuts together-apart.”
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The work of twentieth-century Danish philosopher-physicist Niels Bohr is foundational to Barad’s
thinking. According to Barad, Bohr’s demonstration that an “apparatus” (an ensemble of
laboratory equipment, experimental design, and scientist) is always already part of the
“phenomenon” (i.e., the observed can only exist in relationship to its observer) is a brilliant and
essential notion that forms the basis for her concept of “agential realism.”46 On the view that
“objectivity is not predicated on an inherent or Cartesian cut between observer and observed,”
Bohr was in direct disagreement with Einstein, who on the contrary believed absolute
separability is a necessary condition of objectivity (Barad 2007,339).

For Einstein, the structure of reality allows for the existence of an observer positioned actually
outside of an entirely separate thing that is being observed. For Bohr, reality consists of
phenomena one part of which (the observed) can be measured under particular conditions by an
aspect of the same phenomena (the observer). “Bohr’s was objectivity in the absence of inherent
separability. According to Bohr, the experimental evidence forced on us a recognition of quantum
nonseparability” (Barad 2007,340). Einstein’s is a hard Cartesian cut, while Barad and Bohr argue
for an “agential cut,” one that is a “local condition of exteriority-within-phenomena...Intraactions cut things together-apart (as one movement)” (Barad 2012,32). In Barad’s agential realist
view, “The boundaries and properties of component parts of the phenomenon become
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In a nutshell: Bohr showed that the results of experiments with atomic particles change according to the set-up
of the experimental design: “Running the experiment without the which-slit detector reveals a diffraction
pattern—that is, the atoms behave like waves. If the experiment is run again with the which-slit detector in place,
the pattern is that of particles, just as Bohr predicted. This is direct empirical evidence that identity is not fixed and
inherent, but performative” Barad 2012,43). For a far more detailed account, see Chapter Seven of Barad’s 2007
Meeting the Universe Halfway starting on page 247.
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determinate only in the enactment of an agential cut delineating the ‘measured object’ from the
‘measuring agent’…agential cuts cut things together and apart” (Barad 2007,337,381).

The profoundness of the difference between the conceptual stances of Einstein and Bohr, and
the necessity of an immediate shift to a Bohrian/Baradian perspective cannot be overstated:
Bohr is making a point about the nature of reality, not merely our knowledge of it. What
he is doing is calling into question an entire tradition in the history of Western
metaphysics: the belief that the world is populated with individual things with their own
independent sets of determinate properties. In particular, Bohr’s naturalist commitment
to understanding both the nature of nature and the nature of science according to what
our best scientific theories tell us led him to what he took to be the heart of the lesson of
quantum physics: we are a part of that nature that we seek to understand. Bohr argues
that scientific practices must therefore be understood as interactions among component
parts of nature and that our ability to understand the world hinges on our taking account
of the fact that our knowledge-making practices are social-material enactments that
contribute to, and are a part of, the phenomena we describe (Emphasis the author’s.
Barad 2007,19,26).

The underlying theme of my thesis is the (arguably obvious but nonetheless urgently in need of
emphasis) notion that, while we may seem to be outside observers of an external reality, it is
more accurate and constructive to maintain, at the same time, “we are a part of the nature that
we seek to understand.” Dualisms and paradoxes abound, but we do not need to remain bound
to them. It is possible to be individuals and not-individuals at the same time.

To Barad (and Bohr), an ethical component is inherently lacking in dualistic mindsets:
“This” and “that,” here” and “now,” don’t preexist what happens but come alive with
each meeting. The world and its possibilities for becoming are remade with each moment.
If we hold on to the belief that the world is made of individual entities, it is hard to see
how even our best, most well-intentioned calculations for right action can avoid tearing
holes in the delicate tissue structure of entanglements that the lifeblood of the world runs
through. Intra-acting responsibly as part of the world means taking account of the
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entangled phenomena that are intrinsic to the world’s vitality and being responsive to the
possibilities that might help us flourish. Meeting each moment, being alive to the
possibilities of becoming, is an ethical call, an invitation that is written into the very matter
of all being and becoming. We need to meet the universe halfway, to take responsibility
for the role that we play in the world’s differential becoming (Barad 2012,396).

The ethical part of this way of looking at physics lies within the suggestion that if we are part of
the intra-active becoming of everything else in the universe, then there is nothing that is “other,”
nothing that is not “self,” nothing we are not responsible for and nothing not deserving of care.
Biology also reinforces the view that knowing where “we” end and an “other” begins is nebulous
at best. As Barad says, “There is no discrete ‘I’ that precedes its actions” (Barad 2007,395):
According to my agential realist ontology, or rather ethico-onto-epistemology (an
entanglement of what is usually taken to be the separate considerations of ethics,
ontology, and epistemology), ‘individuals’ do not preexist as such, but rather materialize
in intra-action. ‘Individuals’ do not not exist but are not individually determinate. Rather,
individuals only exist within phenomena (particular materialized/materializing relations)
in their ongoing iteratively intra-active reconfiguring…It is through specific agential intraactions that the boundaries and properties of ‘individuals’ within the phenomenon
become determinate and particular material articulations of the world become
meaningful…So it is not that there are no separations or differentiations, but that they
only exist within relations (Barad in Kleinman 2012:77).

While in this post-humanist view humans are displaced from a lofty position apart from and
above the rest of “nature,” this does not diminish human accountability for matters at hand, of
which many of us are well aware, and in which we are direct participants. From Barad’s
perspective, “There are no singular causes” and “responsibility is not ours alone.” However, “our
responsibility is greater than it would be if it were ours alone. Responsibility entails an ongoing
responsiveness to the entanglements of self and other, here and there, now and then” (Barad
2007,394).
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In other words, everyone (and everything) matters. For Barad “mattering” is a verb, a thing that
happens when matter matters. Barad says, “…matter is not a fixed essence; rather, matter is
substance in its intra-active becoming––not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency” (Barad
2003:828):
Our (intra)actions matter—each one reconfigures the world in its becoming—and yet
they never leave us; they are sedimented into our becoming, they become us. And yet
even in our becoming there is no ‘I’ separate from the intra-active becoming of the world.
Causality is an entangled affair: it is a matter of cutting things together and apart (within
and as part of phenomena). It is not about momentum transfer among individual events
or beings. The future is not the end point of a set of branching chain reactions; it is a
cascade experiment (Barad 2007,394).

Arguably, imagining ourselves as situated within a responsive and vibrant universe, very much a
part of a grand, non-deterministic “cascade experiment,” was precisely the definition of “reenchantment” and the concern of the Romantic Naturalists.

While science can (and does) provide elegant evidence that “we are part of the nature that we
seek to understand,” science may not be best equipped to instill in its adherents a sense of what
this feels like in practice; helping to facilitate direct personal experiences of the sublime—
enchantment—has historically been the realm of the arts.

In this chapter, I examined the overlaps between Bookchin and Clark’s social ecology, the
theoretical physics of Bohm and Bohr, the dialectical biology of Levins and Lewontin, and Barad’s
agential realism. I drew parallels between the approaches of these twentieth and twenty-firstcentury thinkers and those of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Romantic Naturalists.
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In the following chapter, I examine how those in the avant-garde arts of the twentieth and
twenty-first century developed (and are developing) creative techniques for the subversion of
dualistic, hierarchical, reductionist, exploitative imaginaries.
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4. DADA AND SURREALIST ARTS OF RE-ENCHANTMENT:47

During and after World War I, disillusioned by the absurdity of a cataclysm that resulted in the
deaths of tens of millions, avant-garde artists and intellectuals “shared a moral revulsion against
the whole tradition of European civilization that seemed bent solely on its own destruction”
(Lewis 1988,1). Calling themselves Dadaists—a word itself inherently nonsensical48—beginning
around 1916,49 groups in Germany, France, Switzerland, and the US dissented through strategic
defiance of social convention. “As an alternative to the conduct that led a world to war, Dada
gambled on misbehavior in order to transgress all etiquette and establish a new cultural
(dis)order” (Kochhar-Lindgren et al. 2009,113). Dadaism was an invitation to evaluate forms of
absurdity perpetrated by world powers versus those instigated by the very people who become
caught in the crossfire. Jean Arp, one of Dada’s founders, wrote:
In Zurich in 1915, losing interest in the slaughterhouses of the world war, we turned to
the Fine Arts. While the thunder of the batteries rumbled in the distance, we pasted, we
recited, we versified, we sang with all our soul. We searched for an elementary art that
would, we thought, save mankind from the furious folly of these times. We aspired to a
new order that might restore the balance between heaven and hell…The Renaissance
taught men the haughty exaltation of their reason. Modern times, with their science and
technology turned men towards megalomania. The confusion of our epoch results from
this overestimation of reason. We wanted an anonymous and collective art (Arp 1948,3940).
“Re-enchantment” is ostensibly the effort (put forth by the Romantic Naturalists, Surrealists, and others) to
return to a feeling of wonder and appreciation for that which cannot be measured (love, awe, etc.). However, it
must be pointed out that destructive forms of enchantment are dangers that require careful avoidance. In an essay
titled “The Dialectic of Enchantment,” philosopher John P. Clark warns against the kinds of “misenchantment” that
have been features of late capitalism (i.e.: “the Fetishism of Commodities” a la Marx, “The Spectacle” according to
the Situationists). “Unless we begin to take seriously the domination of enchantment, and begin to vanquish the
enchantment of domination, we will never achieve the liberation of enchantment, or experience fully the
enchantment of liberation” (Clark 2019b).
48 According to some accounts, “It was in a Zurich café in 1916 that Tristan Tzara invented the word ‘Dada,’ and the
very insignificance of its two syllables was a spur to his circle’s enthusiasm” (Duplessis 1950,15).
49 While some accounts suggest that Dadaist activity was occurring a year or two earlier, a pivotal moment
occurred in February of 1916 when Hugo Ball organized the first gathering of the Cabaret Voltaire in Zurich,
Switzerland (Richter 1965,13).
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Critique of polarized, reductionist, individualist modes of thought was inherent in the Dada
project (or anti-project, as the case may be 50) from its inception. Hans Richter, an artist who
became affiliated with the Dada movement after an injury sustained in World War I,51 also traced
the origins of the type of destructive “logic” gripping Europe to a mindset that elevates the
advancement of science and technology above humanistic concerns:
Our scientific and technological age had forgotten that this contingence [between
apparently opposing concepts] constituted an essential principle of life and of experience
and that reason with all its consequences was inseparable from unreason with all its
consequences. The myth that everything in the world can be rationally explained had
been gaining ground since the time of Descartes. An inversion was necessary to restore
the balance. The realization that reason and anti-reason, sense and nonsense, design and
chance, consciousness and unconsciousness, belong together as necessary parts of a
whole—this was the central message of Dada (Emphasis the author’s. Richter 1965,64).

A “necessary inversion” that highlights the consequences of unreason could be instigated,
according to the Dadaists, through creative activities that hold seeming contradictions in states
of unresolvedness in order to demonstrate the inherently elusive nature of constructed
contraries. To deem something objectively “reasonable,” for example, requires a subjective —
emotional and intuitive—judgement. Hans Richter recounted:
…radical attack on dualistic thought was in the very nature of the movement. The
liberation and expansion of thought and feeling was to be followed by the integration of
both in verse, in painting, and in musical sound. ‘Reason is a part of feeling, and feeling is
a part of reason’ (Arp) (Richter 1965,60).
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According to Hans Richter, “Dada not only had no programme, it was against all programmes. Dada’s only
programme was to have no programme…and, at that moment in history, it was just this that gave the movement
its explosive power to unfold in all directions, free of aesthetic or social constraints” (Richter 1965,34).
51 Biography at the National Gallery of Art, Washington DC (via Internet Archive):
http://web.archive.org/web/20160516153803/http://www.nga.gov/exhibitions/2006/dada/artists/richter.shtm/.
Accessed November 10, 2019.
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Infusing everyday life with actions that seemed absurd—in contrast to that which might typically
be considered ordinary or “normal”—was integral to the Dadaist strategy. This involved forms of
creative activity intended to confound and disrupt the prevailing rationale, such as poems
consisting of meaningless syllables or words clipped from newspapers and selected at random
out of a hat; music containing sounds made using unconventional instrumentation (such as
machinery and sirens) and without identifiable refrains; collage made by combining photographs,
drawings, and random bits of printed ephemera; and sculptures consisting of assemblages of
found objects (Lewis 1988,3,5).
Protesting with great vigour against the mechanistic world view which had led to the
obscenity of the First World War, these artists sought an elemental art which might put
people back in touch with poetic depths of both themselves and the world (Tucker
1992,13).

To be in touch with the “poetic depths” was to develop a heightened awareness of the cycles,
forces, and processes by which the other-than-human world unfolds. According to Richard
Huelsenbeck, a founder of the Berlin Dada group, the Dadaists believed the human psyche could
be freed to explore richer and more nuanced—and, ironically for a movement driven by
existential angst, perhaps more “meaningful”52—realms by engaging oneself in, as opposed to
distancing oneself from, the “automatic forces of nature” that “work in the unconscious,
regardless of our conscious presence and in spite of our blindness or willful interference.”
Huelsenbeck felt Dadaists operated with an acute awareness of the notion that “life lives us as
we live life” (Huelsenbeck 1974,161).
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Perhaps this is what Emmy Ball-Hennings was implying with her statement “Paradox triumphed” (Hennings
quoted in Huelsenbeck 1974,xxxv)?
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Arp reiterated in his 1932 “Notes from a Dada Diary”:
reason tells man to stand above nature and to be the measure of all things. reason has
cut man off from nature…dada wanted to destroy the rationalist swindle for man and
incorporate him again humbly in nature… dada is for nature and against art (Motherwell
1951 (1981],222).

For the Dadaists, one way to demolish the “rationalist swindle” and be “for nature” was to
develop techniques that remove human logic and the perceived need for learned expertise from
the practice of art-making by embracing processes (such as “techniques of free association,
fragmentary trains of thought, unexpected juxtapositions of words and sounds”) that introduce
unplanned elements (Richter 1965,55). Richter explained:
…chance must be recognized as a new stimulus to artistic creation. This may well be
regarded as the central experience of Dada, that which marks it off from all preceding
artistic movements. [The use of chance operations] taught us that we were not so firmly
rooted in the knowable world as people would have us believe. We felt that we were
coming into contact with something different, something that surrounded and
interpenetrated us just as we overflowed into it. The remarkable thing was that we did
not lose our own individuality. On the contrary, the new experience gave us new energy
and an exhilaration…that gave us wings to fly – and to look down upon the absurdities of
the ‘real’ and earnest world (Emphasis the author’s. Richter 1965,51).

The Dadaists were driven by the paradoxical sense that one’s personal creativity can be most
fully expressed by relinquishing conscious control of, and identification with, individual
technique. “This contradiction between rational and irrational opened a bottomless pit over
which we had to walk” (Richter 1965,61):
Chance appeared to us as a magical procedure by which one could transcend the barriers
of causality and of conscious volition, and by which the inner eye and ear became more
acute, so that new sequences of thoughts and experiences made their appearance
(Richter 1965,57).
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While Dadaism succeeded in challenging dualisms and hierarchy and illuminating the irrationality
inherent in prevailing “logic,” in its drive to disrupt and destroy the old reality—up to and
including itself53—it possessed a fatal flaw. Huelsenbeck claimed, “Dada was a protest without a
program, without a political program. We protested the system without ever offering
alternatives” (Huelsenbeck 1974,xiv). Slovenian philosopher Aleš Erjavec notes that, as such, it
“was not an instigator of an aesthetic revolution,54 for it negated such a revolution rather than
affirmed it” (Erjavec 2015,259).
Our provocations, demonstrations, and defiances were only a means of arousing the
bourgeoisie to rage, and through rage to a shamefaced self-awareness. Our real motive
force was not rowdiness for its own sake, or contradiction and revolt in themselves, but
the question (basic then, as it is now), ‘where next?’ (Richter 1965,9)

For some of the Dadaists, the answer to the question “Where next?” involved, at least in part,
altering some of the movement’s self-negating underlying principles to reflect the recognition
that change may be better affected by participating in (as opposed to disengaging oneself from)
society in a way that could upend its conventional workings. By applying many of Dada’s methods
(collage, automatic writing, improvisation, collaboration, chance operations, etc.) toward more
overtly political (namely Socialist55) and humanist ideals, poets André Breton, Louis Aragon,
Benjamin Péret, Paul Éluard (all four of whom had directly experienced atrocities during their
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Tristan Tzara, one of Dada’s founders said, “Being a dadaist means being against dada” (Tzara quoted in
Huelsenbeck 1974,139).
54 As opposed to simply representing the world, Erjavec defines “aesthetic avant-gardes” as revolutionary practices
which seek to “substantially affect and transform our ways of experiencing and sensing the world, to change in
important ways the manner in which we perceive and experience reality” (Erjavec 2015,3). Erjavec traces the
origin of the term to German Romanticism when it was used in a similar context, for example, by Friedrich Schlegel
(Erjavec 2105,5).
55 “[The Surrealists] became Marxists and it is in their political commitment that they differ most from the
Dadaists. They joined protest demonstrations, wrote manifestoes against the war, nationalism, militarism, racism,
colonialism, and Christianity; and fought against all forms of oppression” (Lewis 1988,x).
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involvement in World War I), and others transmuted their energies into the movement known as
Surrealism56—over or above realism, as directly translated from French57—in early 1920s France
(Lewis 1988,17, Fijalkowski and Richardson 2016,95).

The Surrealists understood successful socio-political revolution would require a concurrent shift
in the way people perceive themselves and their relationships to one another and the world; in
providing catalysts for this shift, the Surrealists believed they could contribute constructively to
the revolutionary Socialist project. Bulgarian Surrealist writer and sociologist Nora Mitrani was
of the opinion that Surrealism, in its emphasis on expanding and cultivating the imaginative
capacity of a populace—as “a means of total liberation of the mind”58—could serve as a vital
supplement to the Marxist project. In 1960, she wrote that Marxism without focus on fostering
collective creativity would ultimately prove insufficient:
[To all] forms of exploitation, Surrealism opposes its unflinching refusal. If it is a matter of
political and social revolution as defined by the Marxists, let us say that it falls far short of
what Surrealism wants. This type of revolution is not enough…(Mitrani in Rosemont 1994,
294).

In contrast to Dadaism, Surrealism set out to offer accessible tools with which to interrogate and
alter the prevailing reality:
Surrealism, far from being a pessimistic concept of life, not only reveals unsuspected
possibilities to man, but strives as well to furnish him with the means to realize them.
That is why the Surrealists have again turned toward the real, and why they have built up
56

The poet Guillaume Apollinaire is credited with having coined the word surrealism in 1917 (Duplessis 1950,91).
Not all authors quoted in this thesis treat the word as a proper noun. All quotations contained herein maintain the
formatting used by their authors.
57 According to Online Etymology Dictionary: https://www.etymonline.com/word/surrealism. Accessed December
14, 2019.
58 From the first issue of La Révolution surréaliste, a Surrealist periodical published from 1924-1929 (Lewis 1988,2628).
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a theory of social action qualified to change the external conditions that limit man’s
existence (Duplessis 1950, 128).

Breton made clear in his 1935 “Speech to the Congress of Writers” that Surrealism is indeed
intended to serve a socio-political agenda:
…we maintain that the activity of interpreting the world must continue to be linked with
the activity of changing the world. We maintain that it is the poet’s, the artist’s role to
study the human problem in depth in all its forms, that it is precisely the unlimited
advance of his mind in this direction that has a potential value for changing the world…It
is not by stereotyped declarations against fascism and war that we will manage to liberate
either the mind or man from the ancient chains that bind him and the new chains that
threaten him. It is by the affirmation of our unshakeable fidelity to the powers of
emancipation of the mind and of man that we have recognized one by one and that we
will fight to cause to be recognized as such. ‘Transform the world,’ Marx said; ‘change
life,’ Rimbaud said. These two watchwords are one for us (Breton 1972,237-241).

For the founding group of Surrealists (composed mostly of former Dadaists), transforming the
world and changing life would require “re-enchanting” the [post-Enlightenment] world (Roberts
in Hopkins 2016, Roberts in Fijalkowski and Richardson 2016, Löwy 2009). Brazilian-French
sociologist Michael Löwy argues Surrealism was a direct extension of the spirit of the Romantic
Naturalists. He claims, “Surrealists have drunk deeply from the underground springs of
Romanticism,” and the Surrealist movement, like the revolutionary Romantic one, involved a
“…radical pursuit of a decentralized, directly democratic civil society committed to human
creativity, artistic autonomy, and open expression” (Löwy 2009,ix). Löwy claims the Surrealists
shared with the Romantics an aversion to “the ugly, disinterested rationality of the
Enlightenment that garbled ideas of freedom and community into the modern State’s
administrative systems of social control and progress” (Löwy 2009,ix).
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In his 1930 “Second Manifesto of Surrealism,” André Breton declared Romanticism a century
hence to be “still in the flower of its youth” at the hands of the Surrealists for whom the tail of
the earlier movement was an “amazingly prehensile” one (Breton 1930 [1970],153).

In their shared effort to re-enchant the world, the Surrealists carried forth the Romantic
Naturalists’ obsession with “the marvelous,” a term used in early science to describe the
paradoxical, ambiguous, or difficult to classify—things such as coral that could be construed as
both rock and animal, fossilized seashells that appeared at high altitudes, or crystals that seemed
to have a pulse (Daston and Park 2001,14).

For the Surrealists, the marvelous evoked a kind of “immeasurably expanded awareness” that is
“ordinarily repressed or suppressed in exploitative, inegalitarian societies” (Rosemont
1998,xxxiii). In 1941, Martiniquan Surrealist René Ménil wrote:
Marvels appear only at the moment when life, in the emotion felt, truly grasps man so as
to throw him unwillingly outside the habitual and common conditions of life into
unknown and more profound conditions of reality. In this rapture, one is lost to the self
and saved from its restrictive circumstances. Lost to the self but found to the world
(Emphasis the author’s. Ménil in Richardson and Fijalkowski 1996,92).
As the boundaries between “self” and “other” dissolve, so too do other seeming contraries. For
the Surrealists, like the Dadaists before them, this feeling was found to be one of liberation as
opposed to one of uncertainty or confusion. Ménil goes on to describe how, in the bright light of
the marvelous, polarities can dissipate:
In the land of marvels, contraries can intimately rub shoulders or, more accurately, are
able to communicate, to be mutually compelling…life and death, the communicable and
the incommunicable, past and future, the possible and the impossible, are
interdependent and cease to be perceived as contradictory (Ménil in Fijalkowski and
Richardson 1996,92).
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For the Surrealists of the 1920s through the 1960s, the marvelous—the poetic, intangible, nonliteral—served as evidence of gaps in the “rationale” of dominant systems of power and control
that could be activated in asserting the existence of forms of knowledge that subvert prevailing
views and move beyond prescribed possibilities. Breton sought a contrary approach, believing,
“Our brains are dulled by the incurable mania of wanting to make the unknown known,
classifiable” and “The desire for analysis wins out over the sentiments” (Breton 1924[1972],9).
According to historian Donna Roberts, “…the surrealists pursued a radical epistemological shift
that would re-assimilate connective analogical and poetic thinking into the process of
knowledge” (Roberts in Fijalkowski and Richardson 2016,218). Surrealist methodology
constituted for its practitioners a form of scientific research “into the areas of life before which,
they believed, positive science falters” (Roberts in Hopkins 2016,288). Such concerns are similar
to those of the Romantics, for whom the study of nature involved:
…[being] an active participant as opposed to rigorously detached observer in the
Baconian tradition; the cultivation of a sense of awe before the intricate wonders of
nature in which the observer is transported out of himself and able to perceive the subtle
interplay between subject and object; and, above all, the connection between personal
experience and the experience of nature as constitutive of true knowledge (Kuhn 2009,3).

Though the approaches to inquiry implemented by both the Romantics and Surrealists differed
substantially from the prevailing empirical methods, both groups were arguably performing
rigorous forms of systematic investigation. For the Surrealists, the workings of human
consciousness and the shaping of what is collectively considered “real” and “rational” was of
primary interest:
The Surrealists now considered themselves scientists because they were serious explorers
of a new world: the unconscious, the dream, the fantastic, or the ‘marvelous,’ a favorite
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word in their vocabulary. They stressed the systematic, experimental, and scientific
character of their new method (Emphasis the author’s. Lewis 1988,19).
According to Roberts, the Surrealists shared with the earlier Romantic Naturalists the embracing
of a form of inquiry that was not goal-oriented, and that allowed for the researcher to gain insight
into one’s own proclivities through the encounter with that being researched:
This vital science would counter positivistic reductionism with a form of re-enchantment
that would force a return to non-utilitarian values, and, through a re-instatement of the
mysterious, question and reawaken meaning…With its attention to both analysis and
feeling, this sensibility, like that of the naturalist, is distinguished by a rare sensitivity to
objects and environments, and, particularly like that of the Romantic naturalist, an
engagement with nature that leads to self-discovery (Roberts in Hopkins 2016,289).

She goes on to say, for both the Surrealists and the Romantic Naturalists, “…the study of nature
required an active and imaginative subject, one that responds to feeling as much as reasoning”
and “It is this combination of the Romantic naturalist that is reconstituted within the figure of
the surrealist as emotive and analytical, ecologically engaged and self-reflective” (Roberts in
Hopkins 2016,289).

Techniques such as collage, “open work,”59 spontaneous and chance operations, and
interdisciplinary collaboration and improvisation were, for their practitioners, “poetic” forms of
inquiry designed to “disrupt positivist and other restrictive ways of thinking and being” while
demonstrating the human condition as paradoxically part of and distinct from an all-pervading
nature (Rosemont 1998,xxxiii). Aimé Césaire, another Martiniquan Surrealist and founder of the
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The term open work, according to writer and semiotician Umberto Eco, refers to forms of art that leave
elements purposely unfinished or ambiguous, to be interpreted, contributed to, or completed by the viewer,
reader, or listener. “According to Eco, traditional art confirms conventional views of the world, whereas the
modern open work implicitly denies them” (Eco 1989,xi).
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Négritude60 movement, spoke of poetry as a means of gathering an emotionally “satisfying
knowledge” that can “unite us with nature;” he declared the poet is “someone who saves
humanity, someone who restores it to universal harmony, someone who marries a human
florescence to universal florescence” (Césaire in Fijalkowski and Richardson 1996,135-139).61

In the “First Manifesto of Surrealism,” Breton described the technique of “psychic automatism”
as flowing, unfettered creativity that could “assert a direct relation between perception and
representation, refusing any need for an intermediary agent to effect the passage from one to
the other” (Richardson in Fijalkowski and Richardson 2016,131). Instead of conventionallythought-of art as representation or imitation of nature, “the surrealists posited the role of art in
political thought as constituted within and by the dialectic of interpretation that takes place
between and among objects, concepts, forms, and spectators” (Eburne in Fijalkowski and
Richardson 2016,34). In the “First Manifesto,” Breton defined Surrealism as:
Psychic automatism in its pure state, by which one proposes to express—verbally, by
means of the written word, or in any other manner—the actual functioning of thought.
Dictated by thought, in the absence of any control exercised by reason, exempt from any
aesthetic or moral concern (Breton 1924[1972],26).
In other writings, he offered specific instructions intended to be usable by anyone, regardless of
training or level of skill:
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Jose Rosales offers a concise definition of Négritude in his paper “Of Surrealism & Marxism”: “Negritude is a
historical category of surrealism precisely because it is the concept that renders intelligible an alienation and
dispossession whose history predates the individual, social, and economic alienation criticized by Breton: namely,
the historical dispossession and alienation experienced by colonized peoples at the hands of Europe that is
subsequently covered over by European modernity and civilization.” He goes on to say “…if surrealism was to live
up to its socio-political aspirations there is reason to believe that it was Césaire, along with Damas, Senghor, and
others who belong to African diasporic history who brought surrealism closest to its goals” (Rosales 2016,9).
61 Thesis advisor Dr. Thomas Doran notes parallels here with the sentiment of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 1844 essay
“The Poet,” which, Doran adds, inspired Walt Whitman’s “Song of Myself.”
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Write quickly, with no preconceived subject in mind, quickly enough so that you cannot
recall what you have written and so that you will not be tempted to re-read it…Continue
as long as you please…After a word whose origin seems suspect to you, put any letter
whatsoever, the letter l for example, and retrieve the arbitrary character of the writing
by making this letter the first one of the following word (Breton in Lewis 1988,22).

According to Helena Lewis, scholar of Dada and Surrealism, egalitarianism was at the heart of the
Surrealists’ aims:
[The Surrealists] insisted that talent is irrelevant and that, using the methods of psychic
automatism, anyone is capable of creation. Everyone has an unconscious; therefore,
everyone is a potential poet. This was the exciting new discovery they tried to
communicate (Lewis 1988,23).

Automatist techniques were intentionally crafted to subvert a social imaginary that tends to
glorify the individual. Surrealists believed creativity should not be a privilege reserved for the
elite; rather, all people, by engaging in creative acts, can exercise a right to imagine an alternative
present and future, one that is fair and just for everyone (Fijalkowski and Richardson, eds.,2016).
“Poetry must be made by all” was the prerogative borrowed by Surrealism’s founders from the
mid-nineteenth-century writings of their adopted hero, Uruguayan-born French poet Isadore
Ducasse, aka Comte de Lautréamont (Sakolsky 2002,118).

In order to help people gain access into their innate poetic potential, the Surrealists developed
“technopoetic processes” and “productive algorithms” in the form of games designed to shortcircuit hindrances to creativity. “Driven by revolutionary possibilities for collective thought and
creation,” this kind of recherche experimentale (experimental research) was intended to be
“collective and noncompetitive” and to produce “images unimaginable by one mind alone”
(Kochhar-Lindgren et al. 2009,5-6). “Players are participants in a communal technology that
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enables them to learn something about the world through presentation rather than representation” (Kochhar-Lindgren et al. 2009;xxii-xxiv). Unexpected juxtapositions can reveal
unfamiliar relationships and produce novel results: “The sympathy existing between two or
several beings seems to lead them toward solutions they would never have found on their own”
(Breton 1937[1987],34).

In one collaborative automatist formulation, a player begins by drawing or writing a word or
phrase on a sheet of paper, then concealing all but a small part of the original contribution by
folding the paper over it. The next player adds on where the first player left off, leaving a small
bit showing, then passes the project on. The process continues until all players have had an
opportunity to contribute.
For the Surrealists, to fold was to hide and to reveal at once—to hide the body of a work
that the next participant might automatically wish for, and to reveal, in the few lines
pressing over the fold, the possibilities of a ludic experience that becomes simultaneously
both singular and collective (Emphasis the authors’. Kochhar-Lindgren, Schneiderman,
Denligner 2009;xxiii).

The game was named “Exquisite Corpse” after a phrase generated by an early effort by Tanguy,
Prévert, Breton, and Duchamp: “Le cadavre exquis boira le vin nouveau” (“The exquisite corpse
will drink the new wine”) (Duplessis 1950,48).

The practice of Exquisite Corpse was intended by its progenitors to subvert conventional
hierarchical, individualistic, dualistic, inhibited modes of thinking and being in the world. It served
as “an antidote to the dominant idea of the rational, the unified ego, and the commodification
of the once-public artistic sphere provoked by the rise of capitalism” (Kochhar-Lindgren et al.
59

2009,xxiii). By allowing paradoxes to exist in dynamic tension, by allowing the spontaneous and
serendipitous to emerge, by blurring the boundaries between individual and collective, the
Surrealists were committed to la vie poétique (the poetic life), and deployed it in defiance of the
detached, disenchanted, commodified rationality of the ruling classes.

While critics such as Desmond Morris62 have expressed the view that Surrealism—like the
nineteenth-century Arts and Crafts movement, the Bauhaus in the twentieth century, and other
European-born artistic (and political) movements intended to be “for the people”—in some ways
fell short of its radically inclusive and anti-elitist ideals (Frieda Kahlo referred to Breton and his
ilk as “coocoo lunatic sons of bitches”63), others including Penelope Rosemont have pointed out
the Surrealists “always opposed overt as well as de facto segregation along racial, ethnic, or
gender lines” and “diversity has always been one of [Surrealism’s] hallmarks” (P. Rosemont 1998,
xxx-xlvii). She notes the movement included those from Middle Eastern and African countries,
North and South America, and the Caribbean, and emphasizes that women, while often
portrayed in historical accounts as little more than muses for male counterparts, were powerful
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“…it must be said that [Breton] was a pompous bore, a ruthless dictator, a confirmed sexist, an extreme
homophobe, and a devious hypocrite. He was widely disliked, even among his followers” (Morris 2018,52).
63 In a 1939 letter to Nickolas Muray, Frieda Kahlo wrote:
You have no idea the kind of bitches these people are. They make me vomit. They are so damn
‘intellectual’ and rotten that I can’t stand them anymore. It is really too much for my character—I’d rather
sit and sell tortillas than to have anything to do with those ‘Artistic’ bitches of Paris. They sit for hours on
the ‘cafés’ warming their precious behinds, and talk without stopping about ‘culture’ ‘art’ ‘revolution’ and
so on and so forth, thinking themselves the gods of the world, dreaming the most fantastic nonsense, and
poisoning the air with theories and theories that never come true. Next morning they don’t have anything
to eat in their house because none of them work and they live as parasites of the bunch of rich bitches
who admire their ‘genius’ of ‘Artists.’ Shit and only shit is what they are.
https://en.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=Frida_Kahlo,_Paris,_France_letter_to_Nickolas_Muray,_Ne
w_York,_N.Y.,_1939_Feb._16&oldid=9125575/. Accessed November 3, 2019.
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influences and vital contributors to the movement. Rosemont, in fact, argues “it is [women] who
deserve credit for making the ecological critique an integral part of the surrealist project.” She
claims the women of Surrealism prefigured later socio-ecological movements in calling for
“redefinition of the relation between humankind and other animals, solidarity with endangered
species, [and] a nonexploitative regard for the planet we live on” (P. Rosemont 1998,li).

Yves Duplessis (nom de plume of scholar Yvonne Duplessis) wrote:
Far from taking refuge in ivory towers, the Surrealists aim only to demolish them—by the
transformation of human existence—until reality’s victims need no longer struggle to flee
from reality, but, instead, may influence it, and make it conform to their aspirations
(Duplessis 1950,5).
As one of the famed slogans from the peoples’ uprisings in Paris in May 1968 proclaims:
l’imagination au pouvoir, or “power to the imagination.” Once “reality’s victims” are able to
comprehend the power of the imagination to reach beyond the practical, “an infinity of new and
emancipatory possibilities” becomes available (Franklin Rosemont in Sakolsky 2002,120).

Penelope and Franklin Rosemont, like Löwy and Duplessis, feel passionately about the restorative
potential of the Surrealist project:
In a nutshell, the surrealist argument goes like this: If civilization persists on its disastrous
path—denying dreams, degrading language, shackling love, destroying nature,
perpetuating racism, glorifying authoritarian institutions (family, church, state,
patriarchy, military, the so-called free market), and reducing all that exists to the status
of disposable commodities—then surely devastation is in store not only for us but for all
life on this planet. Effective ways out of the dilemma, however, are accessible to all, and
they are poetry, freedom, love, and revolution (P. Rosemont 1998,xxxiv).

The poetry of Surrealism, for Rosemont, involves
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…always discovery, risk, revelation, adventure, an activity of the mind, a method of
knowledge leading to revolutionary solutions to the fundamental problems of life...an
insurrection of the imaginary to overthrow all limitations imposed on the real (P.
Rosemont 1998,xxxiii-xxxiv).

On the necessity of love in the Surrealist equation, Breton could not have been clearer: “…it is in
human love that all the power dwells for regenerating the world” (Breton from his Arcanum 17
quoted in Duplessis 1950,143). “Mad love,” as Breton referred to it, is the condition under which
one is able to most fully experience, in the dissolution of the boundary of “self” and “other,” the
arational marvelous (Breton 1983[1937]). Duplessis explains:
This optimistic prospect of a humanity reconciled with both itself and the universe
achieves the unity sought by the Surrealists…Science remains powerless to procure the
keys for man, and it has disrupted that contact with nature that only poetry can give…art,
science, and revolution converge toward the same goal: the harmony of man and the
universe. [Surrealism] opposes classical Western philosophy as well as every negative and
hopeless concept of existence. It allies itself with the great advances of thought, which
escape all historical classification since they aim at nothing less than to resolve the
agonizing problem of our destiny (Duplessis 1950,144-147).
As powerful as knowledge derived from modern, empirical methods of inquiry has proven itself
to be, questions related to the understanding of how love works, what causes it, why it is
essential to our sense of well-being, and how to catalyze it are among the keys science is
powerless to procure. This does not by any means detract from science’s value or integrity as a
form of knowledge-production; while analysis of the passionate desire to care for and protect
one another and the place we call “home” is outside its purview, such impulses may well be
harbored by its practitioners. For the Surrealists, unbound by conventional limits, “Art, science,
and revolution converge toward the same goal: the harmony of man and the universe” (Duplessis
1950,146).
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With those who would accuse such a project of utopianism, I would agree before proceeding to
emphasize the important functions utopias and their exponents serve. British sociologist Ruth
Levitas defines the utopian project as an open-ended exercise in critical thought:
Utopia is the expression of the desire for a better way of being. This includes both the
objective, institutional approach to utopia, and the subjective, experiential concern of
disalienation. It allows for this desire to be realistic or unrealistic. It allows for the form,
function and content to change over time. And it reminds us that, whatever we think of
particular utopias, we learn a lot about the experience of living under any set of conditions
by reflecting upon the desires which those conditions generate and yet leave unfulfilled.
For that is the space which utopia occupies (Levitas 1990,8).

If the aspiration toward fairer, healthier societies and more verdant and sustainable ecologies is
dismissed as unattainable, impractical, or “unrealistic,” we must ask: Who is behind the
dismissing, and who stands to gain from it? If we concede, are we willing to remain condemned
to whatever undesirable conditions may be at hand? Who gets to decide what is “realistic,” or
what can be made “real”? The Surrealists were among those who declared the right to actualize
“reals” that could stand in contrast to those of self-interested industrialists, colonizers, and
profiteers.

Members of these twentieth-century socially-conscious art movements were reacting to some
of the devastating outcomes of the absurdities, paradoxes, and contradictions inherent in socalled Western Enlightenment thought that, in the century prior, the Romantic Naturalists had
tried to warn against. (Mis)enchanted by the promise of social and technological “progress” and
equality for the world’s people, many of the Enlightenment’s self-defeating, even catastrophic,
flaws remain strategically obfuscated. Those in the arts, sciences, humanities, and politics who
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have addressed, and are currently addressing, such issues continue to be pushed to the margins,
labeled “fringe” or avant-garde, by overwhelmingly powerful interests and their gatekeepers.

Fortunately, not all (im)possibilities have been explored. As Huelsenbeck wrote in 1957,
“Naturally art is not dead, but it needs a new effort at clarification of its principles in an age that
is giving itself over to self-destruction with terrifying enthusiasm (Huelsenbeck 1957 in
Huelsenbeck 1974,179).

In Chapter Five, I look at ways the arts and sciences might work more fruitfully in tandem as we
hurdle headlong into the Anthropocene. To quote a document from Group N, a Dadaist-affiliated
outfit that existed in Padua, Italy in the 1950s, “We do not believe in an Art holding aloof from
the world of perception in which we live. It is no longer enough to look at the world through the
microscope of reason. It is here that art can work together with science to build up a true picture
of the world we live in” (Richter 1965,95).
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5. THE INTRICATE ENSEMBLE: THE ART OF AN ECOLOGICAL IMAGINARY
In previous chapters I asked what movements and innovations have historically been used to
trouble dualisms. I looked at the ways naturalists, social and political theorists, ecologists,
biologists, physicists, and artists—mostly those descended from within European intellectual
traditions of the past two-and-a-half centuries—have explicated the inherently intra-constituted
nature of nature, and of being. Conventional disciplinary boundaries notwithstanding, in this
chapter I ask: What might an effective socially-, politically-, scientifically-, ecologically-,
aesthetically-conscious “real”-subverting practice consist of today? What techniques can serve
to catalyze a sense of intra-dependence on the scale necessary now?

Science—as modernity’s most relied-upon form of knowledge production and the channel
through which the world’s human inhabitants are rapidly becoming aware that continuation
down the current free-market, corporate-controlled path leads to self-destruction—will
obviously be an essential part of any program. From a position within the culture of the early
twenty-first-century United States, it is amply evident that a dearth of scientific literacy is a grave
threat to public health.

By the same token, what is apparently not self-evident is the idea of relying solely on science to
generate solutions to the current matrix of human-caused predicaments is also fraught with
fundamental problems.64 In light of science’s capacity to produce stunning insights into the
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In addition to numerous “technological fixes” based on planet-scale geoengineering, billions of dollars are
currently being spent by the US government in collaboration with corporate interests on the notion that humans
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workings of “nature” while simultaneously envisioning itself as an altogether separate entity,
some questions must be raised: Is the prevailing institutionally-directed, corporate-driven
science legitimately in a position to shift from profitable, cost-externalizing technologies toward
ones that prioritize sustainability and take into account all manner of impacts? If we agree
“nature” or “the environment” is more than a discrete, detached thing “out there” that can be
fully understood by isolating and examining its constituent parts, can we rely upon a mode of
inquiry that wholly disavows the observer’s interrelationship with the observed to provide
evidence that absolute separation is illusory?65

A preliminary solution may be for those working within scientific fields to advocate for the
greatest possible fairness and (post-)humaneness within that framework (as the organization
Science for the People is admirably doing66), and for those in fields not strictly obliged to the
rigors of the scientific method67 to develop logics and techniques that, according to ColombianAmerican anthropologist Arturo Escobar, “enable us to resituate humans within an ecological
understanding of life, arriving at decolonial and genuinely intercultural modes of knowledge
production” (Escobar 2018,99).

may one day colonize an inhospitable planet 140 million miles away: https://www.nasa.gov/topics/moon-tomars/overview. Accessed December 29, 2019.
65 In some ways, this is precisely what quantum physics is doing. See Chapter 7 “Quantum Entanglements:
Experimental Metaphysics and the Nature of Nature” in Karen Barad’s 2007 Meeting the Universe Halfway.
66 “One of Science for the People’s greatest legacies is its corpus of literature analyzing how the forces of
capitalism, imperialism, racism, and patriarchy shape the production, circulation, and application of scientific
knowledge (Schmalzer et al. 2018,6). For more information on SftP, see: https://scienceforthepeople.org/
Accessed November 14, 2019).
67 Defined here very generally as the widely-accepted stepwise method crafted by early experimental
philosophers: develop a hypothesis, design an experiment, run tests, formulate a conclusion, revise and/or repeat.
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This is precisely what proponents of fields within the recently labeled environmental humanities
have been calling for since the turn of the twenty-first century. Scholars working in this realm
(including the social ecologists, agential realists, and philosophers of science covered in Chapter
Three who were working in this domain before it had an official heading), understand “what have
traditionally been termed ‘environmental issues’ have been shown to be inescapably entangled
with human ways of being in the world, and broader questions of politics and social justice” (Rose
et al. 2012,1). They operate from the position that even the most ominous data may not be
sufficient to move people to action:
Unfortunately, intellectual and cultural enlightenment does not necessarily lead to
changes in human behavior. Science has discovered, to its despair, that new accretions of
information may have no impact and that laying out a set of rational choices may not lead
to action. Indeed, scientific understandings of the physical world may be of limited use
for understanding the complexity and volatility of human values and motivations. While
the sciences may observe and analyze change, they are not organized or structured to
create social policy and influence humans to change values and opinions. The human
sciences—the mixed bag of academic disciplines in the humanities—are, on the other
hand, a fertile and largely untapped resource of insight into human motivation, creativity,
and agency (Holm et al. 2015,981).

Ethnographer Deborah Bird Rose and science historian Libby Robin are among contributors to
emerging environmental humanities fields who have advocated for the development of
interdisciplinary, non-hierarchical, dialectical, anti-colonial, situated (as opposed to universal)
knowledges:
The ecological humanities work across the great binaries of western [sic] thought. We
work in a time of rapid social and environmental change and are committed to crosscutting the divides that impede our understanding and action. Our academic division
between arts and sciences compounds the problems that divide, inhibiting the work we
need to be doing. So too, does the ranking of knowledge systems that places western [sic]
science at the top of an epistemological ladder (Rose and Robin 2004,1-2).
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Rose and Robin argue those within the fields of environmental humanities are well-positioned to
reexamine the concepts of progress, meaning, ethics, and justice in light of human dominance
over fellow humans, other-than-human life, and planetary ecosystems and processes. Modes of
thought attentive to such concerns acknowledge humanity’s exceptional capacities and the
responsibilities it therefore bears, while simultaneously working to resituate humans
ontologically to a place within, rather than apart from or above, an externalized “nature.” They
share the agential realist stance that existence is a fundamentally intra-active phenomenon:
The new ecology starts with this fundamental assertion: that the unit of survival is not the
individual or the species, but is the organism-and-its-environment…being is inherently,
inescapably, and necessarily relational. An ontology of connectivity entails mutual
causality: organism and environment modify each other. The major shift is from atomism
to connectivity…The imperative of learning to think about and with connectivity can be
operationalized as an imperative to enlarge the boundaries of thought and to enlarge
thinking itself – to enhance our ability to think in dialog and, perhaps, in empathy with
others (Rose and Robin 2004,2).

With regard to thinking in dialog and empathy with others, Colombian-American anthropologist
Arturo Escobar asks: “…what would it mean to develop a personal and collective practice of
interbeing” (Escobar 2018,103)? He says:
…for this to happen it is necessary to step out of the (purely) theoretical space into some
domain of experience (political, contemplative, even policy or design oriented, or what
have you) – in other words, it is imperative to engage with (or perhaps contribute to
creating) worlds where it is impossible to speak of nature and culture as separate
(Emphasis the author’s. Escobar 2018,103).

For Escobar, therefore, there are two key steps: set out with a mindset of relationality or intraexistence (“…considering things as mutually constituted, that is, viewing things as existing at all
only due to their dependence on other things”) followed by situatedness in action (Emphasis the
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author’s. Escobar 2018:101, 103).68 Escobar is insistent that praxis—critical thought coupled with
appropriate action—is urgently called for in light of current social and ecological catastrophesin-progress (Escobar 2018,103).

Disconcertingly, as Poul Holm and fellow environmental humanities scholars point out, “Like
most other researchers, humanities scholars see their role primarily as analytical rather than
prescriptive” and “most academics would fear that their academic credentials were potentially
compromised by activism.” They recognize “This disconnect between thought and action is a
conundrum which must be overcome if the abstract call on the humanities to inform global
change is to be turned into practice” (Holm et al. 2015,985).

It is the underlying theme of my thesis that all disconnects between thought and action must
now be rapidly overcome in the interest of addressing the ever-mounting complex of “wicked
problems”69 that a relatively small number of humans have instigated, but which all life on Earth
now faces. I have maintained throughout that vestiges of the Romantic Naturalist and Surrealist
efforts to “re-enchant” the world by defying dualisms, reviving the marvelous, and revealing
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This brings to mind an assertion by twentieth-century conceptual artist Joseph Beuys put forth in his 1978
“Appeal for an Alternative”: “Before considering the question WHAT CAN WE DO, we have to look into the
question HOW MUST WE THINK?” https://issuu.com/sethjordan/docs/beuys_appeal. Accessed April 26, 2019.
69 “Wicked problems” are those which are inherently complex and whose solutions run the risk of inadvertently
causing additional dilemmas:
[Wicked problems] by their very nature defy complete and clear solutions. When we address one or more
sides of an issue, other aspects can be aggravated and new aspects that we did not foresee can turn up,
generating results that nobody wanted. Wicked problems often include both natural resource issues and
human responses to these, such as war and migration. The heterogeneous nature of the challenges
confronting us also proliferate a new set of problems that arise when solutions are implemented in haste
(Holm et al. 2015,981-982).
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absurdities advanced by post-Enlightenment-era “logic” can be found in the work of social
ecologists, agential realists, and avant-garde artists throughout the contemporary environmental
humanities. I am suggesting the significance of their efforts has been underestimated and could
be fruitfully re-examined in light of present struggles. I believe their project remains incomplete,
and similar efforts are of urgent necessity today.

Given the background presented, I now pose some questions: With respect to our current
dilemma and the range of wicked problems at hand, if a desirable approach is to establish an
ecological imaginary (aimed in particular at the cultures within which such a mindset is currently
lacking), what type of practice(s) may be most effective in producing such an outcome? What
kinds of thought and action have the potential to affect the visceral realization that our own fates
and seeming identities are coupled with, and are constantly being reshaped in relation to, the
fates and identities of everyone and everything else?

While there are likely to be many appropriate answers to these questions,70 I am proposing the
development and deployment of an ecological imaginary based on ideas and strategies drawn
from those of the Romantic naturalists, Surrealists, environmental humanities-oriented scientists
and scholars, and socio-ecologically conscious artists. I have described a range of already-existing
work throughout this thesis. I will now present a few additional examples that might be
incorporated into strategies going forward.
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Lively and in-depth discussion is encouraged.
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In the course of my own work and practice over the past three decades as both a scientist and
an artist, it has been my experience that the techniques of improvising and experimental
musicians offer a profoundly direct route to a shared sense of being as an intricate ensemble.
Some of these approaches, accessible to anyone regardless of prior knowledge, may be of service
to those seeking to cultivate imaginaries with which to confront present social and ecological
dilemmas.

In An Ethics of Improvisation: Aesthetic Possibilities for a Political Future (2011), Canadian author
and academic Tracey Nicholls claims improvisational music practices can serve as models of nonhierarchical, non-competitive, cooperative self-governance. The more respect and care
participants pay to one another, the more successful the outcome is likely to be. Ultimately
Nicholls’ conclusions are remarkably similar to Escobar’s in Designs for the Pluriverse; both see
the way forward as radical interdependence coupled with radical autonomy:
This aesthetic commitment to collaboration understands improvisation as a process of
solidarity-building, an act that takes place over time. The identity and community being
negotiated is such that those involved in the performance are no longer conceiving of
each other as ‘other.’ I don’t mean, however, to suggest that what is going on in the
improvising performance is an erasure of individual personhood. It would be more
accurate, I think, to speak of this experience of being caught up in the music as a
temporary setting-aside of one’s insistence on differentiation from others (Nicholls 2011,
158).

Highly-developed modes of getting at this “setting aside” of differentiation can be found within
Surrealism, improvised music, and certain Eastern contemplative traditions. Though these are
distinct practices, perhaps it can be said they have in common a form of conscious “detaching”
from a mindset of the strictly differentiated individual that, paradoxically, can lead to an
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expanded sense of “self.” Breton recognized the relationship of Surrealist automatism with
Eastern thought, and noted, far from a haphazard or simple affair, achieving a satisfying and
productive engaged-yet-disengaged state of mind requires diligence (LeBaron 2002,28).

Musician and composer Anne LeBaron argues musical improvisation may be an even more direct
route from the imagination into the embodied/experiential than other (written or visible)
artforms:
Automatism, the alloy that welded the infrastructure of surrealism, has its most direct
musical parallel in free improvisation. I define this as non-idiomatic [not connected to any
identifiable indigenous form, style, or tradition] improvisation embodying a unity of mind
and action: musical concept and performance take place simultaneously. In accessing the
unconscious by the most direct and immediate means, non-idiomatic musical
improvisation might elicit an even speedier transfer from the unconscious into sensory
product (sound, in this case) than either visual or literary automatism (LeBaron 2002;37).

She goes on to explain musicians who incorporate this type of improvisation into their work share
in common the Surrealist impetus to “investigate new territory” and avoid “complacency and the
comfort of the familiar turning instead to expansion at the risk of occasional failure.” She adds,
“…an axial component of most successful improvisations is ever present: the mode of listening
to one another” (LeBaron 2002;38-39).

In the case of improvisation, listening is paramount to any sound or music that might emerge in
response.71 Feminist composer Pauline Oliveros (1932-2016) was a progenitor of a practice she
and her collaborators playfully named “Deep Listening” after an experience they had in 1988
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This brings to mind Lefebvre’s rhythmanalyst, “capable of listening to a house, a street, a town as one listens to a
symphony” introduced in Chapter One (See Lefebvre 2004,89).
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while making a recording in a reverberant well fourteen feet underground.72 Rensselaer
University, where the Deep Listening Institute has been housed since Oliveros’ death in 2016,
provides an overview:
[Deep Listening] explores the difference between the involuntary nature of hearing and
the voluntary, selective nature of listening…It cultivates a heightened awareness of the
sonic environment, both external and internal, and promotes experimentation,
improvisation, collaboration, playfulness and other creative skills vital to personal and
community growth.73

Oliveros intended her pieces to be inclusive to all, musicians and non-musicians alike. Her “Sonic
Meditations” are suggested activities in the form of short written instructions. Oliveros explains
in a 1971 issue of SOURCE: Music of the Avant Garde magazine:
Sonic Meditations are intended for group work over a long period of time with regular
meetings. No special skills are necessary. Any persons who are willing to commit
themselves can participate. The ♀︎Ensemble to whom these meditations are dedicated
has found that non-verbal meetings intensify the results of these meditations and help
provide an atmosphere which is conducive to such activity. With continuous work some
of the following becomes possible with Sonic Meditations: heightened states of
awareness or expanded consciousness, changes in physiology and psychology from
known and unknown tensions to relaxations which gradually become permanent. These
changes represent the tuning of mind and body. The group develops positive energy
which can influence others who are less experienced. Members of the group achieve
greater awareness and sensitivity to each other. Music is a welcome by-product of this
activity (Oliveros 1971;104).

One concise example is titled “Native.” It reads in its entirety: “Take a walk at night. Walk so
silently that the bottoms of your feet become ears” (Oliveros in Lucier et al. 1972,104).

72 Pauline Oliveros describes the origins of Deep Listening:

https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/261881/261882/. Accessed May 6, 2019.
73 About Deep Listening at RPI: https://www.deeplistening.rpi.edu/about-deep-listening/. Accessed May 10, 2019.
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Goethe believed that by honing one’s senses, by attuning to and with the subject at hand, “Each
phenomenon in nature, rightly observed, wakens in us a new organ of inner understanding”
(Goethe quoted in Seamon and Zajonc 1998,3). Oliveros, too, is suggesting new organs of
perception are available to nearly everyone; to use them all we need do is notice they are already
there.

I have personally had the opportunity to participate in (and facilitate) Oliveros’ profoundly
moving World Wide Tuning Meditation on several occasions. A group of willing participants—no
prior musical training is necessary—are invited to vocalize long vowel sounds, alternating
between matching one another’s pitch and intoning unique pitches. The following text is the
score74 in its entirety:
WORLD WIDE TUNING MEDITATION (2007)
Begin by taking a deep breath and letting it all the way out with air
sound. Listen with your minds’ ear for a tone.
On the next breath using any vowel sound, sing the tone that you
have silently perceived on one comfortable breath.
Listen to the whole field of sound the group is making.
Select a voice distant from you and tune as exactly as possible to
the tone you are hearing from that voice.
Listen again to the whole field of sound the group is making.
Contribute by singing a new tone that no one else is making.
Continue by listening then singing a tone of your own or tuning to
the tone of another voice alternately.
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Score for Pauline Oliveros’ “World Wide Tuning Meditation” provided via personal correspondence, 2012. Listen
to a recording of Oliveros articulating the instructions in her own voice here:
http://alycesantoro.com/tonal_relativity.html#audiolizations. Accessed November 16, 2019.
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Commentary: Always keep the same tone for any single breath.
Change to a new tone on another breath. Listen for distant
partners for tuning. Sound your new tone so it may be heard
distantly.
Communicate with as many different voices as possible.
Sing Warmly!

During the Tuning Meditation, as members of the group listen carefully to all sounds present,
one’s individual voice vacillates between blending in and seeming amplified. The whole and the
parts simultaneously exist and dissolve. Escobar’s vision of the radically interdependent coupled
with the radically autonomous is realized in sound. The World Wide Tuning Meditation is one
way to answer Escobar’s question: “How can relational modes of knowing, being, and doing be
catalyzed now?”

Twentieth-century poet Allen Ginsberg offered another solution to the riddle of simultaneous
autonomy/interdependence in the form of a suggestion to “Notice what you notice.”75,76 While
this advice may seem, at first, almost so simplistic as to be nonsensical, in practice it serves the
function of challenging the observer-observed relationship inherent in the Western scientific
method. Upon noticing a thing, a dynamic interrelationship forms. For Ginsberg (and anyone who
takes his advice), by leaving impressions on our sensory system (altering mood, atmosphere,
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I had the good fortune to hear Allen Ginsberg urge his audience to “notice what you notice” during a reading at
the University of Rhode Island in 1991. This advice is also contained within his 1986 poem “Cosmopolitan
Greetings.”
76 Incidentally, noticing what one notices is precisely the aim of phenomenology.
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state of inspiration, etc.), noticed things alter our state of being in ways that unnoticed things
may not (noticed things may, for example, serve to inspire, delight, edify, frighten, etc.).77,78

To weave Joseph Grange, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Allen Ginsberg together into a single
statement: by perceiving our “selves” as having qualities apparently separate from yet
interconnected with all other phenomena at the same time, new ethical and aesthetic
possibilities for modes of existence in the world can be revealed. This can happen because in the
process of noticing, the “other” is recognized as an aspect of “self”:
…inspection of the object must lead back to the intending observer whose thought about
it defines the object he is observing. It necessarily follows that the description of an object
must disclose something about the subject, even something of his very condition of being
(Fallico 1962,8).

Barad speaks of the ethical imperative that comes with awareness of our entanglement with all
other beings that can be thought of in relation to the work of improvising musicians discussed
above:
Responsibility, then, is a matter of the ability to respond. Listening for the response of the
other and an obligation to be responsive to the other, who is not entirely separate from
what we call the self. This way of thinking ontology, epistemology, and ethics together
makes for a world that is always already an ethical matter (Barad in Dolphijn and van der
Tuin 2012,69).
By thinking and acting in a mindset of reciprocity or symbiosis—acting as if the “other” is an
extension of “self”—in the context of Western societies whose members are conditioned to be
concerned more with economic “health” than with other, less-quantifiable measures (such as
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Bearing in mind that unnoticed things can also serve as clues.
Bearing in mind that imagined things are also capable of generating effects.
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physical or emotional well-being), the issue of what it means to act in “self-interest” is called
starkly into question. If it is in fact determined that what is in the best interest of oneself is to
care deeply for one’s surroundings and the inhabitants with whom they are shared, this troubles
the entire project of societies whose ruling-class-driven imaginaries depend on competitiveness,
financial gain, and excessive consumption of non-renewable resources for their reproduction.

In another 79 powerful instance of how knowledge drawn from the context of science can (for
better or worse) influence culture at large, some of the basis for hierarchical and exploitative
social structure can be traced to biased interpretations of the work of nineteenth-century
biologist Charles Darwin. In Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution, early twentieth-century Russian
revolutionary Peter Kropokin expounds at length on the dangers of an overarching view that
interprets “survival of the fittest” as a struggle between weak and strong without noting “the
fittest” are often those who excel at cooperation (Kropotkin 1902). More recently, biologists
associated with the Science for the People movement including Richard Levins and Richard
Lewontin have published numerous articles on the overtly racist and sexist aims of
“sociobiologists” who have used evolutionary theory to conveniently further agendas that
benefit those who very often happen to match their own gender, ethnic background, and class:
It is not surprising that the model of society that turns out to be “natural” bears a
remarkable resemblance to the institutions of modern market society, since the theorists
who produce these models are themselves privileged members of just such a society.
Thus, we find that aggression, competition, extreme division of labor, the nuclear family,
the domination of women by men, the defense of national territory, individualism are
over and over stated to be manifestations of ‘human nature’ (Science for the People
Editorial Collective 1977,133).
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Copernicus’ heliocentric model of the solar system was addressed in Chapter Three.
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The closely-related field of “genetic determinism” is the effort to justify particular social
behaviors using genetic programming to the exclusion of social conditioning. For genetic
determinists, “human nature” is a fixed, inborn aspect of behavior upon which external social
forces have no bearing:
For more than a century, the idea that human social behavior is determined by
evolutionary imperatives and constrained by innate or inherited predispositions has been
advanced as an ostensible justification for particular social policies. Deterministic theories
have been seized upon and widely entertained not so much for the alleged
correspondence to reality but for their more obvious political value as a kind of social
excuse for what exists (Science for the People Editorial Collective 1977,134).

Throughout this thesis I have attempted to show that, when cracks in a social imaginary are
exposed and “hidden absurdities” (to borrow a term from Husserl) within them revealed, the
humans who notice them, released from a kind of fugue state, acquire the potential to imagine
and actualize a different, more beneficial way of being; crisis of imagination may cease and the
constructive engagement of imagination can begin.

The final phase of Friedrich Schelling’s Naturephilosophie included a “Philosophy of Art” in which
he asserted the imaginative act “potentizes reason, releases its potential, and makes ideas
productive: they appear in material form” (Engells 1981,305). “As the dialectic between self and
nature, the imagination reconciles and fuses the transcendental intelligence with the material
systems of nature. Art has a vital epistemological function. Art is a dialectic” (Engell 1981,302).
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Science, as a medium by which a human agent brings intangible impulses out of the realm of the
imaginary and into the realm of the “real,” is also dialectic.
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6. CONCLUSION
At 5:30am on July 16, 1945, at the Alamogordo Bombing Range (a place that had been known by
Spanish conquistadores as Jornada del Muerto, the route of the dead man80) in the New Mexican
desert, the Manhattan Project completed its Trinity Test, the detonation of an 18.6 kiloton
plutonium bomb.81 As he watched the explosion, Dr. Robert J. Oppenheimer, director of the
project, famously recalled a line from Hindu holy book the Bhagavad-Gita: “I am become death,
the destroyer of worlds.”82 If it had not been widely apparent prior to this moment, it certainly
became known immediately afterwards: Homo sapiens—“wise man”—had acquired the power,
previously ascribed only to gods and other supreme forces, to annihilate itself.

In addition to the nuclear threat, most of Earth’s human inhabitants now well understand that
many other reckless activities engaged in by some threaten the existence of all. The entire
biosphere is being catastrophically altered by a few hundred years’ worth of exploitative
practices controlled by the wealthiest and most powerful, the majority of whom are now loathe
to abandon the profit motive in favor of more egalitarian, less oppressive systems of social and
economic organization. People around the world in all sectors of society are currently engaged
in resistance to inhumane and ecocidal forces.83 The angst inherent in the Dadaist reaction to the

80According

to page 28 of Marc Simmons’ 1986 book Taos to Tome: True Tales of the Hispanic New Mexico.
to the US Department of Energy:
https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1945/trinity.htm. Accessed November 18,
2019.
82 Video of Oppenheimer recounting the moment of the Trinity Test: https://youtu.be/lb13ynu3Iac.
Accessed November 18, 2019.
83 As of this writing, uprisings are underway in Hong Kong, Lebanon, and Chile, to name but a few hotspots.
81According

80

senselessness of the post-World War I era seems all the more sensible in light of atrocities
currently unfolding.

In fact, the point made by the Romantic Naturalists and Surrealists—that an awareness of the
“marvelous” aspects of existence serves a vital social function—remains highly relevant to the
times at hand: there is still much to be learned from those who never forgot existence is intraactive, and from those who refused, and continue to refuse, to submit to reductive thinking.

For the oppressed, to cultivate and maintain an ability to imagine parallel or alternate possible
presents remains a subversive act. René Ménil wrote:
The land of the marvelous is the most stunning revenge we have…Man sees the
intolerable limits of everyday life fall from him like so much tawdry finery. Everything
really becomes possible for him. He can transgress his spatial boundaries: he transforms
himself into a tree, an animal, a peaceful lake, so discovering precious secrets as in a
game. He overcomes space by instantly crossing infinite distances. He holds past and
future, space and time, life and death in his hands…(Ménil 1941 in Fijalkowski and
Richardson 1996,91).

In light of the current state of the world, Ménil’s words may seem almost excruciatingly
optimistic. But giving all power to the imagination (l’imagination au pouvoir) may remain among
the most potent and accessible tactics available. As philosopher Herbert Marcuse stated
(somewhat paradoxically), “Art cannot change the world, but it can contribute to changing the
consciousness and drives of the men and women who could change the world” (Marcuse 1977
[1979],32).
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To reiterate: this thesis is intended neither to assert that art can solve all problems, nor to claim
modern science is inherently flawed. From a position of constructive critique, it has been my
purpose, rather:

1. To establish creative practices as essential forms of knowledge production in and of themselves.
I am suggesting artistic techniques—ones that arouse the imagination, senses, and emotions—
can be effectively applied in concert with science’s rigorous and dispassionate methods.
Situations that tend to treat art as an embellishment capable only of serving in an illustrative or
support capacity, or that otherwise use art to uncritically reinforce the authority of a science
which fails to take humanitarian and ecological concerns foremost into account, are, I maintain,
less constructive.84

2. To invite science to critically examine a paradox inherent within itself. Science’s revered
objective stance—undeniably useful as a mindset for the purposes of research—is neither a
scientifically demonstrable condition of reality, nor is it necessarily constructive when applied in
a non-scientific (social) context. I believe science, in its privileged position as humanity’s
preeminent form of knowledge production, reinforces a “detached” attitude that runs the
perilous risk of preventing the most destructive segment of humanity from understanding itself
(ourselves) as interconnected with one another and the biosphere.
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At the same time, the artist should not feel obliged to force their works into a scientific idiom (i.e.: works need
not have a tangible, quantifiable, or repeatable component) in order to be accepted as valid by either practitioners
or audiences. Science is science; art does not need to be science also.
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3. To suggest practices which expand the imagination are valuable not only to those in the arts,
but to those in the sciences, and to assert that a sound understanding of science can be of great
practical use to those in creative fields.

Umberto Eco describes how “contemporary art can be seen as an epistemological metaphor”:
What we find in art is less the expression of new scientific concepts than the negation of
old assumptions. While science, today, limits itself to suggesting a probable structure of
things, art tries to give us a possible image of this new world, an image that our sensibility
has not yet been able to formulate, since it always lags a few steps behind intelligence—
indeed, so much so that we still say that the sun ‘rises’ when for three centuries we have
known that it does not budge (Eco 1989,90).

Ultimately, I am calling for authentic, critical engagement of the methods of science in tandem
with those of the arts. By bringing Goethe’s delicate empiricism, Schelling’s Naturephilosophie,
Dadaist and Surrealist natural history, and the efforts of musical improvisors into dialog with the
contemporary environmental humanities, I am pointing toward a mode of thought and action
that engages the seemingly paradoxical yet complementary mindsets of art and science. I believe
vacillating between—or the simultaneous holding of—states of objectivity and subjectivity,
individuality and collectivity, prescription and improvisation can be of use to the collaborative
formation of a constructive image of oikos, our shared home, regardless of one’s primary
discipline.

Alexander von Humboldt expressed similar sentiments when he stated reason and imagination
must be considered equally:
It would be a denial of the dignity of human nature and the relative importance of the
faculties with which we are endowed, were we to condemn at one time austere reason
83

engaged in investigating causes and their mutual connections, and at another that
exercise of the imagination which prompts and excites discoveries by its creative powers
(Alexander von Humboldt 1858,78).

As the Surrealists understood, such dialectical practices are only useful in relation to the
revolutionary project:
It is not enough…for man to become the instrument of his unconscious, for he should
occupy himself with finding a concrete solution to the problems of existence. Surreality is
not to be sought solely on ‘the other side,’ but should become integrated with the
attributes of consciousness in order to recognize this harmony of being that will finally
reconcile man to himself (Duplessis 1950 [1962],109).

And the revolutionary project at hand is monumental—for life on Earth to continue to thrive, the
Anthropocentric model of the universe must rapidly go the way of the geocentric one. What
practices have the potential to aid humanity in coming to see itself as part of an intricate
ensemble with one another and the biosphere? What might be the most effective and efficient
methods of restoring a sense of the marvelous, and how can they be implemented?

Can an avant-garde effort succeed now where similar past movements failed to take hold? I argue
“success,” as a constantly-moving target, is an unfounded concern; there is never a fixed point at
which victory is declared and all struggles cease. Movements inspire and reinforce one another,
reconfigure, reorganize, and re-emerge in new forms, as we have seen in the twenty-first century
with the Arab Spring, Occupy, the Indignados, #BlackLivesMatter, Standing Rock, #MeToo, and
many other social, environmental, and political uprisings around the world. According to a 1907
definition, avant-garde started out as a military term referring to the “advance guard” or the
“vanguard”:
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The avant-garde générale, avant-garde stratégique, or avant-garde d'armée is a strong
force (one, two, or three army corps) pushed out a day's march to the front, immediately
behind the cavalry screen. Its mission is, vigorously to engage the enemy wherever he is
found, and, by binding him, to ensure liberty of action in time and space for the main
army.85

Terms like “avant-garde,” “queer,” “utopian,” or “surreal,” by definition, refer to things that are
out of the ordinary, ahead of their time, or are unexpected, rare, or uncommon in occurrence.
“Queer” is defined as “strange, peculiar, eccentric” 86 and “utopia” literally means “no place”. 87
But for those who select these terms, the subtext is that what’s considered normal is in need of
adjustment. When it is widely taken for granted that quantum particles can leap from one place
to another without having been anywhere in between,88 those particles will cease to be “queer,”
and some other phenomenon may take their place in the pantheon of queerness.

Barad poetically describes “queer” as:
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From Sadowa, an account of the 1866 war between Prussia and Austria written by General Henri Bonnal and
Charles Francis Atkinson referenced at Online Etymology Dictionary: https://www.etymonline.com/word/avantgarde. November 19, 2019.
86 Definition of “queer” from Online Etymology Dictionary: https://www.etymonline.com/word/queer. Accessed
November 18, 2019.
87 Definition of “utopia” from Online Etymology Dictionary: Utopia https://www.etymonline.com/word/utopia.
Accessed November 18, 2019
88 Karen Barad on quantum leaps:
Quantum leaps aren’t jumps (large or small) through space and time. An electron that “leaps” from one
orbital to another does not travel along some continuous trajectory from here-now to there-then. Indeed,
at no time does the electron occupy any spatial point in between the two orbitals. But this is not what
makes this event really queer. What makes a quantum leap unlike any other is that there is no
determinate answer to the question of where and when they happen. The point is that it is the intra-play
of continuity and discontinuity, determinacy and indeterminacy, possibility and impossibility that
constitutes the differential spacetimematterings of the world. Or to put it another way, if the
indeterminate nature of existence by its nature teeters on the cusp of stability, of determinacy and
indeterminacy, of possibility and impossibility, then the dynamic relationality between continuity and
discontinuity is crucial to the open-ended becoming of the world which resists acausality as much as
determinism (Barad 2007,182).
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…itself a lively, mutating organism, a desiring radical openness, an edgy protean
differentiating multiplicity, an agential dis/continuity, an enfolded reiteratively
materializing promiscuously inventive spatiotemporality (Barad in Kleinman 2012,81).

Ishmael proclaims in the mid-nineteenth century novel Moby Dick, “Damn me, but all things are
queer, come to think of ’em,” (Melville 1902,109). When everything is queer, nothing is. And then
something is again. And so the cycle goes; avant-gardeness, queerness, and utopianism are
never-ending becomings.

It is my strong impression that the cultivation of an intricate ensemble—in any and every form
this may take—is an appropriate and necessary avant-garde with which to confront the roaring
(boiling, wailing, failing, flailing?) 2020s. Practices and frameworks that emphasize and enhance
collaboration, spontaneity, and care—mad love—in defying convention, contain the potential to
subvert it. Not acting (in-activism) is not an option.
If [aesthetic vision] arouses us in any practical way, it is because it finds us ready, one way
or another, to act. Not the works of art, therefore, but the [person themselves] who
carries in [their] being the potential of rebellion and revolution (Fallico 1962,131).

The impossible is realized every time a “perfect coalescence of feeling with image and image with
feeling” occurs in an act of creativity; we can “know what the possible feels like because we know
ourselves to be its creators” (Fallico 1962,73).

This is a dynamic participatory occasion. 89

89

This is the last line of my 2013 “Manifesto for the Obvious International”:
http://alycesantoro.com/obvious_international.html. Accessed November 18, 2019.
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AFTERWORD
The Sea Limits
Consider the sea’s listless chime:
Time’s self it is, made audible,—
The murmur of the earth’s own shell.
Secret continuance sublime
Is the sea’s end: our sight may pass
No furlong further. Since time was,
This sound hath told the lapse of time.
No quiet, which is death’s,—it hath
The mournfulness of ancient life,
Enduring always at dull strife.
As the world’s heart of rest and wrath,
Its painful pulse is in the sands.
Last utterly, the whole sky stands,
Gray and not known, along its path.
Listen alone beside the sea,
Listen alone among the woods;
Those voices of twin solitudes
Shall have one sound alike to thee:
Hark where the murmurs of thronged men
Surge and sink back and surge again,—
Still the one voice of wave and tree.
Gather a shell from the strewn beach
And listen at its lips: they sigh
The same desire and mystery,
The echo of the whole sea’s speech.
And all mankind is thus at heart
Not anything but what thou art:
And Earth, Sea, Man, are all in each.
––Dante Gabriel Rossetti, 1849-1855
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From The Dada Painters and Poets: An Anthology, Edited by Robert Motherwell, 1951, p 274.

96

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis is dedicated to my parents Jeannette and Nicholas Santoro. In a heartbreaking turn of
fate, losing them both during the 12 months prior to the start of RISDs NCSS program led to my
participation in it. This (and all of my work) stands as an artifact of their ever-present love,
support, inspiration, and encouragement, for which I am eternally grateful.
Thanks to my spouse Julian Mock for clearing the path. The completion of this program was a
collaboration; I look forward to sharing any benefits that may come from it, including ongoing
discussion and development of the ideas explored here.
Thanks to the five brilliant, patient reader-advisors whose insights, recommendations, and
provocations improved my thinking and writing dramatically (any errors or weaknesses are
certainly my own!):
Damian White
Thomas Doran
Winifred Lambrecht
John P. Clark
Nancy Zastudil
Sarah Moon
I am grateful also to all the thinkers and artists referenced within, and to those who contributed
indirectly, for being part of the intricate ensemble.

97

